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I. INTRODUCTION
My main thesis is that the doctrine of strict liability for abnormally
dangerous activity (which I sometimes refer to by the acronym
SLADA), memorialized in sections 519 and 520 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts,' has evolved to the point of near extinction because
courts have concluded that the negligence system functions effectively
to deter the serious risks posed by the activities involved. The
Restatement (Second) provides that strict liability is inapplicable when
the high degree of risk can be eliminated by the exercise of reasonable
care.2 The evidence demonstrates that courts are increasingly making
precisely that finding, usually without any reliance on record evidence,
but instead on a judicial sense that very few risks are incapable of being
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs §§ 519-520 (1977). Sections 519 and 520
read as follows:
Section 519. General Principle
(1) One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability
for harm to the person, land or chattels of another resulting from the
activity, although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent such harm.
(2) This strict liability is limited to the kind of harm, the possibility of which
makes the activity abnormally dangerous.
Section 520. Abnormally Dangerous Activities
In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the following
factors are to be considered:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or
chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous
attributes.
Id.
2. See id. § 520(c).
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rendered safe by reasonable precautions. This movement away from
strict liability and toward negligence I refer to as "the negligence
barrier-"
I began my research with the intention of examining decisions
applying sections 519 and 520 to develop a case for some clarification to
those sections to reflect evolving authority since they were first
published thirty years ago. My working hypothesis was that the
requirements of those sections had erected substantial barriers to
sustaining a claim of strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities.
I further hypothesized that the definitions and factors set forth in
sections 519 and 520 needed some tinkering in a Restatement in order to
recapture some of the tort law's origins in Rylands v. Fletche? and to
address several issues that have divided the courts in the last twenty
years or so. I set out to answer these questions and others by reviewing
roughly 100 decisions-a sampling, albeit a large one, decided over the
last thirty-five years-with special emphasis on the decisions rendered
subsequent to 1980. The research reveals that rarely do plaintiffs
succeed in asserting claims for abnormally dangerous activity. The
statements of hostility to the doctrine abound, as will be shown below.
This discovery then prompted a deeper question: Why have courts been
so reluctant to embrace SLADA? The answer largely resides in the fact
that courts reject strict liability because they conclude that the
negligence system can function effectively in enforcing safety concerns
associated with the activity.
In Part 11, 1 briefly capsulize the evolution of SLADA, beginning with
Rylands and tracing the standards employed in the Restatement of Torts
published in 1934 and in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, first
published as a draft in 1964 but not formally issued until 1977. Part II
concludes with an opinion of how the conception of the doctrine
formulated by Francis Bohlen, the Reporter for the First Restatement,
differed from that formulated by William Prosser, Reporter for the
Restatement (Second).
Part HI of the Article examines decisions that have interpreted and
applied the six "factors" set forth in section 520 of the Restatement
(Second), which are to be considered in determining whether an activity
is an "abnormally dangerous" one. Part IlI.B especially focuses on
section 520(c) and its proposition that the risk must be one which the
3. 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (H.L. 1868).
exercise of "all reasonable care" would not have eliminated. What Part
lI.B demonstrates is that the section 520 "factors" really contain one
overriding element-not a mere balancing factor that enters the
equation-namely, that the plaintiff prove that it is not possible to prove
negligence. Part Ill further explores the doctrinal barriers in greater
detail, asking why it is that plaintiffs generally cannot prevail with
regard to the factors of the Restatement (Second). While the
Restatement (Second) stipulates that all six factors are important, and
none is indispensable to the weighing process,' the decisional reality is
different. Courts quote the stipulation, but then proceed to rule that,
because the plaintiff cannot demonstrate that due care would not have
minimized the danger, SLADA is held inapplicable. Literally dozens of
recent decisions come down squarely for the proposition that the
plaintiff has failed to sustain its burden (usually on a motion to dismiss
or summary judgment) of proving that this activity involved the kind of
unavoidable risk that no amount of care, even the utmost care, could
minimize. What the courts are saying is that virtually all risks can be
reduced to acceptable levels with the exercise of reasonable care-even
risks from activities normally considered "abnormal" or
"ultrahazardous."
In fact, whereas section 520(c) of the Restatement (Second) refers to
the inability to "eliminate" the high risk of the activity by exercising due
care, the cases rule that the relevant inquiry is whether the high risk can
be "reduced" to an acceptably small level, not "eliminated." Moreover,
in defining what is the relevant "activity" to which the section 520
factors are to be applied, most courts opt for a broad definition of the
activity, rather than defining an activity more narrowly as the injury-
causing event or as the injurious result itself. Thus, for example, the
activity is not "leaking underground storage tanks" but rather "the
placement of petroleum products in underground tanks." While no
amount of care can prevent harm from already "leaking" tanks,
reasonable care can most certainly avoid risks of harm from placing
petroleum in nondefective tanks. Other examples of this phenomenon
are pointed out in Part lI.C.
Additionally, courts apply numerous negligence principles that
broaden the reach of negligence liability and thereby obviate the
apparent need for strict liability in this area. Part I[.C demonstrates that
courts invoke negligence per se, the presence of a regulatory scheme, res
ipsa loquitur, and the inherent flexibility of negligence to address highly
risky activities-all with the purpose and effect of avoiding the
imposition of strict liability.
4. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. f (1977).
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Parts Ill.D and III.E examine the other factors that section 520 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts calls for in identifying an abnormally
dangerous activity. Here the research discloses that these factors are
rarely ever outcome-determinative, because the controlling factor is
virtually always the negligence barrier.
Many commentators have advocated and anticipated that liability for
abnormally dangerous activities would expand and that new activities
would be subject to its strict enterprise liability.5 Those beliefs and
predictions have come to naught. In the last twenty years the evidence
reveals that liability under sections 519 and 520 has contracted, not
expanded, and that the range of activities subjected to strict liability has
narrowed; indeed, even jurisdictions reflecting the most aggressive
application of the doctrine-California, Alaska, and Washington-have
indicated a more recent retrenchment. By far the most pervasive
explanation for these developments is that plaintiffs cannot satisfy the
burden imposed by section 520(c) of demonstrating that the risks of the
activity are ones which cannot be eliminated or reduced to acceptable
levels by exercising reasonable care. This is the negligence barrier.
II. EVOLUTION OF THE DOCTRINE: RYLANDS AND THE RESTATEMENTS
A. Origin of Strict Liability
The origins of SLADA are found in one of the most famous cases in
the law of torts, so well known and much written about that I am
reluctant to even discuss it-let alone quote from it-but discuss it and
quote it I must. Rylands,6 now over 130 years old, presented remarkably
simple facts. Defendant mill owners constructed a reservoir upon their
land. The water broke through into the disused and filled-up shaft of an
abandoned coal mine, and flooded along connecting passages into the
5. See, e.g., Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, The Revitalization of Hazardous
Activity Strict Liability, 65 N.C. L. REv. 257 (1987) (the title notwithstanding, there has
been no revitalization); see also Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Negligence Without Fault, 54
CAL. L. REv. 1422 (1966); William K. Jones, Strict Liability for Hazardous Enterprise,
92 COLuM. L. REv. 1705 (1992); Joseph H. King, Jr., A Goals-Oriented Approach to
Strict Liability for Abnormally Dangerous Activity, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 341 (1996). But
see Mark Geistfeld, Should Enterprise Liability Replace the Rule of Strict Liability for
Abnormally Dangerous Activities?, 45 UCLA L. REv. 611 (1998).
6. Fletcher v. Rylands, 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (1865), reversed, Fletcher v. Rylands,
1 L.R.-Ex. 265 (1866), affirmed, Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. at 330.
adjoining mine of the plaintiff. The actual work was performed by
independent contractors, who were likely negligent, but prevailing legal
doctrine requiring privity presumably precluded any direct cause of
action by the plaintiff against the contractors. The arbitrator who stated
the case found that the defendants themselves were ignorant of the
existence of the old coal workings and, therefore, were not negligent
themselves. Moreover, the facts did not quite fit into the existing tort
pigeonholes: there was no trespass because the damage from flooding
was indirect and consequential, as opposed to direct and immediate,7 and
there was no nuisance, absent evidence of something "hurtful or
injurious to the senses" or of damage of a continuous or recurring
nature.8 In the Exchequer Chamber the judgment for defendants was
unanimously reversed. The opinion of Justice Blackburn, one of the
most influential English common-law judges of the nineteenth century,
in one of the most quoted passage in tort jurisprudence, declared,
We think that the true rule of law is, that the person who for his own
purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do
mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is
prim[a] facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of
its escape.... The general rule, as above stated, seems on principle just. The
person whose grass or corn is eaten down by the escaping cattle of his
neighbour, or whose mine is flooded by the water from his neighbour's
reservoir, or whose cellar is invaded by the filth of his neighbor's privy, or
whose habitation is made unhealthy by the fumes and noisome vapors of his
neighbor's alkali works, is damnified without any fault of his own; and it seems
but reasonable and just that the neighbour, who has brought something on his
own property which was not naturally there, harmless to others so long as it is
confined to his own property, but which he knows to be mischievous if it gets
on his neighbour's, should be obliged to make good the damage which ensues if
he does not succeed in confining it to his own property. But for his act in
bringing it there no mischief could have accrued, and it seems but just that he
should at his peril keep it there so that no mischief may accrue, or answer for
the natural and anticipated consequences. And upon authority, this we think is
established to be the law whether the things so brought be beasts, or water, or
filth, or stenches.
7. The court wrote,
I think the true criterion of trespass... that to constitute trespass the act doing
the damage must be immediate, and that if the damage be mediate or
consequential (which I think the present was), it is not a trespass....
"' I entertain no doubt that if the defendants directly and by their immediate
act cast water upon the plaintiffs land it would have been a trespass, and that
they would be liable to an action for it. But this they did not do.
Id. at 745-46 (Martin J.).
8. Id. at 745 (Martin, J.) ("Secondly, I think there was no nuisance in the ordinary
and generally understood meaning of that word, that is to say, something hurtful or
injurious to the senses. The making of a pond for holding water is a nuisance to no
one.").
9. Fletcher v. Rylands, 1 L.R.-Ex. at 279-80.
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As the above statement makes clear, Justice Blackburn did not think he
was making new law, but rather believed he was merely describing
accepted principles, principles closely aligned to the law of nuisance.
The House of Lords affirmed the decision, but circumscribed the reach
of Blackburn's principle. Lord Cairns wrote,
My Lords, the principles on which this case must be determined appear to
me to be extremely simple. The Defendants, treating them as the owners or
occupiers of the close on which the reservoir was constructed, might lawfully
have used that close for any purpose for which it might in the ordinary course of
the enjoyment of land be used; and if, in what I may term the natural user of that
land, there had been any accumulation of water, either on the surface or
underground, and if, by the operation of the laws of nature, that accumulation of
water had passed off into the close occupied by the glaintiff, the Plaintiff could
not have complained that that result had taken place.
This statement is ambiguous because of its reference first to "natural
user of that land" and later to the "laws of nature." Subsequent English
decisions made it abundantly clear that, by "natural," Lord Cairns meant
merely ordinary, appropriate, or customary, given the character of
defendant's and surrounding properties." Thus, liability under the rule
of Rylands would extend only to those activities that are "extraordinary,"
"exceptional," or "abnormal."' 2 As Lord Moulton explained, there must
be "some special use bringing with it increased danger to others, and
must not merely be the ordinary use of land or such a use as is proper for
10. Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. at 338-39. Lord Cairns continued,
On the other hand if the Defendants, not stopping at the natural use of
their close, had desired to use it for any purpose which I may term a non-
natural use, for the purpose of introducing into the close that which in its
natural condition was not in or upon it, for the purpose of introducing water
either above or below ground in quantities and in a manner not the result of
any work or operation on or under the land,-and if in consequence of their
doing so, or in consequence of any imperfection in the mode of their doing so,
the water came to escape and to pass off into the close of the Plaintiff, then it
appears to me that that which the Defendants were doing they were doing at
their own peril; and, if in the course of their doing it, the evil arose to which I
have referred, the evil, namely, of the escape of the water and its passing away
to the close of the Plaintiff and injuring the Plaintiff, then for the consequence
of that, in my opinion, the Defendants would be liable.
Id. at 339.
11. See, e.g., National Tel. Co. v. Baker, 2 Ch. 186 (1893) (Kekewich, J.); West v.
Bristol Tramways Co., 2 K.B. 14 (1908) (Farwell, J.).
12. See Rainham Chem. Works v. Belvedere Fish Guano Co., 2 App. Cas. 465,
471 (H.L. 1921) (Buckmaster, J.); Barker v. Herbert, 2 K.B. 633, 645 (1911) (Farwell,
J.); Noble v. Harrison, 2 K.B. 332, 342 (1926) (Wright, J); Barker, 2 K.B. at 644
(Moulton, J.).
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the general benefit of the community."' 3  The "reasonable use of
property in the way most beneficial to the community" was not within
the purview of the rule. 4 Therefore, applying the lexicon of modem
American decisions, what Rylands calls for is examining the "locational
appropriateness" of the activity and the "commonality of usage," which,
as noted, are among the factors incorporated into the Restatement
(Second) of Torts. 5
B. The Restatement of Torts
William Prosser has traced the response of American courts to
Rylands, which response resembles a swinging pendulum.' 6 Two
jurisdictions accepted the Rylands principle almost immediately,
followed by outright repudiation in the 1870s by New York, New
Hampshire, and New Jersey. 7 Prosser explains that result as deriving
from a misinterpretation of the case as holding a defendant absolutely
liable in all cases whenever anything under its control escapes and
causes harm. Several more jurisdictions followed suit by the early
1900s, each repudiating the SLADA rule. 9 Despite those early setbacks,
gradually the principle took hold and, by the 1930s, close to half of the
American jurisdictions had adopted either the rule of Rylands itself (that
is, the House of Lords' narrower version) or some derivation thereof."
In 1934 the American Law Institute (ALI) commenced the project to
publish the Restatement of Torts, with Francis Bohlen as the Reporter.
Bohlen, who had previously written about Rylands, l proposed a liability
rule that in certain respects went beyond the narrower principle of
13. Rickards v. Lothian, 1 App. Cas. 263, 280 (P.C. 1913) (Moulton, J); Sedleigh-
Denfield v. O'Callaghan, 1 App. Cas. 880, 888 (H.L. 1940) (Wright, J.); Read v. J.
Lyons & Co., 2 All E.R. 98 (1944).
14. Nichols v. Marsland, 10 L.R.-Ex. 255, 259 (1875) (Bramwelll, J); Blake v.
Woolf, 2 Q.B. 426,428 (1898) (Wright, J).
15. William Prosser concluded: "In short, what emerges from the English
decisions as the true 'rule' of Rylands is that the defendant will be liable when he
damages another by a thing or activity inappropriate to the place where it is maintained,
in the light of the character of that place and its surroundings." WILLIAM LLOYD
PROSSER, The Principle of Rylands v. Fletcher, in SELECTED TOPICS ON THE LAw OF
TORTS 135, 147 (1953).
16. See id. at 150-58.
17. See Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476 (1873); Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H. 442
(1873); Marshall v. Welwood, 38 N.J.L. 339 (1876).
18. See PROSSER, supra note 15, at 152.
19. See, e.g., Triple-State Natural Gas v. Wellman, 70 S.W. 49 (Ky. 1902);
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 6 A. 453 (Pa. 1886); Gulf C. & S.F. Ry. Co. v.
Oakes, 58 S.W. 999 (Tex. 1900).
20. See PROSSER, supra note 15, at 152-54.
21. See Francis H. Bohlen, The Rule of Rylands v. Fletcher, 59 U. PA. L. REv. 423
(1911).
[VOL. 36: 597, 1999] Strict Liability
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Rylands, and that also went beyond most of the American decisions
considering some form of strict liability derivative from the English
authority. Published in 1938, the governing sections provided for strict
liability for so-called "ultrahazardous" activities as follows:
Section 519. Miscarriage of Ultrahazardous Activities Carefully Carried On.
Except as stated in §§ 521-4, one who carries on an ultrahazardous activity is
liable to another whose person, land or chattels the actor should recognize as
likely to be harmed by the unpreventable miscarriage of the activity for harm
resulting thereto from that which makes the aS!ivity ultrahazardous, although
the utmost care is exercised to prevent the harm.
Section 520. Definition of Ultrahazardous Activity.
An activity is ultrahazardous if it necessarily involves a risk of serious harm to
the person, land or chattels of others which cannot be eligiinated by the exercise
of the utmost care, and is not a matter of common usage.
In Bohlen's first Preliminary Draft to the Advisors of the ALI,2 prepared
in 1934, he included a note which indicated that "the Reporter has not
stated the effect of the rule announced" in Rylands." The note
concluded with this statement:
The later English cases have extended the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher to
include any form or kind of highly dangerous activity carried on for a purpose
purely personal to the actor, the purpose being one not normal to the average
man. It is this later development of Rylands v. Fletcher which is here stated.
Concerning Bohien's work, several observations are apparent. First,
even a cursory examination reveals that the Restatement went well
beyond the holding in Rylands, especially that of the House of Lords,
because it does not by its terms incorporate the "non-natural user"
principle. Instead it incorporates a notion of an activity not being "a
matter of common usage"--a much different and broader idea, since an
activity might be compatible with its surroundings but not constitute a
common usage, "normal to the average man." Second, the doctrine of
ultrahazardous activities is not limited to adjacent land owners (the
circumstances of Rylands). Third, Bohlen cited English authorities for
the proposition that, while the English cases spoke in terms of "land,"
22. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 519 (1938).
23. Id. § 520.
24. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (Preliminary Draft No. 69, 1934).
25. Id. at 74 (emphasis added).
26. Id. at 75 (emphasis added).
the word "land" is used in the broader sense of any place where "an
abnormally dangerous instrumentality, physical condition or operation is
used, created or carried on."27 Fourth, as Bohlen candidly admitted,
apart from innumerable blasting cases, "there are only a comparatively
few cases... which support the rule stated in this Section. "21 Assuming
that Bohlen favored a regime affording expansive protection for accident
victims, this comment would seem to constitute a sort of admission
against interest. In any event, the comment was deleted from the next
draft and it was also absent in the final Reporter's Notes when the
Restatement of Torts was approved and published by the Institute.29
Bohlen's notes"° reveal that he placed especial reliance on an opinion
written by Chief Justice Knowlton of the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court in Ainsworth v. Lakin.3 ' Knowlton articulated the
following rule:
There is a class of cases in which it is held that one who, for his own purposes,
brings upon his land noxious substances or other things which have a tendency
to escape and do great damage, is bound at his peril to confine them and keep
them on his own premises. This rule is rightly applicable only to such unusual
and extraordinary uses of property in reference to the benefits to be derived
from the use and the dangers or losses to which others are exposed as should not
be permitted except at the sole risk of the user. The standard of duty established
by the courts in these cases is that every owner shall refrain from these
unwarrantable and extremely dangerous uses of property unless he provides
safeguards whose perfection he guaranties.... That there are uses of property
not forbidden by law to wich this doctrine properly may be applied is almost
universally acknowledged.
Ironically, except as implicitly incorporated in the common-usage idea,
the black letter law of the Restatement included no such limitation. The
facts, however, in Ainsworth hardly reflected an unusual use since the
damage was occasioned by the collapse of a wall to a building that had
previously been gutted by fire. On the other hand, Knowlton's reference
to "extremely dangerous uses" was clearly incorporated into the
Restatement rule in section 520A.
Bohlen was also much enamored with an opinion by Judge Augustus
Hand of the Second Circuit in Exner v. Sherman Power Construction
27. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 7001-7002 explanatory notes at 9 (Preliminary
Draft No. 72, 1934).
28. Id. note at 81 (Preliminary Draft No. 69, 1934) (emphasis added).
29. Compare RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 519-520 (Notes to Tentative Draft No.
12, 1935) (comment included), with RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 519-520 (comment
deleted).
30. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS topic 4 note at 75-76 (Preliminary Draft No. 69,
1934).
31. 62 N.E. 746 (Mass. 1902).
32. Id. at 747 (emphasis added).
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Co.3 In Exner, the court extended strict liability beyond blasting to the
storage of explosives, and beyond damage caused by debris cast on the
land of another to damage caused by concussion.' The court, citing
Rylands but not discussing it, explained that defendant's liability was not
founded upon negligence, since none was proved, nor violation of a
statute, since plaintiffs dwelling was not within the distance prohibited
by law for the storage of dynamite, but "upon the ground that the use of
dynamite is so dangerous that it ought to be at the owners' risk."'35
Accordingly, Judge Augustus Hand wrote,
We can see no reason for imposing a different liability for the results of an
explosion, whether the dynamite explodes when stored or when employed in
blasting. To be sure there is a greater likelihood of damage from blasting than
from storage, but in each case the explosion arises from an act connected with a
business conducted for profit and fraught with substantial risk and possibility of
the gravest consequences....
Frequently as much as one thousand pounds of dynamite were stored by the
defendant near a group of dwellings, factories, and a hotel. The fact that the
explosion was severe enough to kill three men, blow up the hut, unsettle and
damage the plaintiffs house, over nine hundred feet away, and that even then,
one hundred pounds of dynamite still remained unexploded, shows that there
must have been a large amount of dynamite in or about the hut at the time of the
accident. When a person engages in such a dangerous activity, useful though it
be, he becomes an insurer.
Furthermore, the imposition of absolute liability is not out of accord with
any general principles of law.... Although liability for injury to the person has
not in most instances survived except where there has been fault, there still
remains absolute liability for trespasses to real estate and for actionable wrongs
committed by servants no matter how carefully they are selected by the master.
The extent to which one man in the lawful conduct of his business is liable for
injuries to another involves an adjustment of conflicting interests. The solution
of the problem in each particular case has never been dependent upon any
universal criterion of liability (such as "fault") applicable to all situations. If
damage is inflicted, there ordinarily is liability, in the absence of excuse. When,
as here, the defendant, though without fault, has engaged in the perilous activity
of storing large quantities of a dangerous explosive for use in his business, we
think there is no justification for relieving it of liability, and that the owner of
the business, rather than a third person who has no relation to the explosion,
other than that of injury, should bear the loss. 3he blasting cases seem to afford
ample analogies and to justify this conclusion.
The quoted language from Exner highlights the dangerousness of the
activity but also implies some relevance for the proximity of the activity
33. 54 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1931).
34. See id. at 514.
35. Id. at 513.
36. Id. at514.
to a populated area. However, an even stronger theme can be seen in
Judge Hand's commitment to strict enterprise liability-i.e., to the
notion that a "business conducted for profit and fraught with substantial
risk" should pay for the losses it causes.3 In that regard, Exner
represents strong authority for the Restatement.
Bohlen also looked38 to Bridgeman-Russell Co. v. City of Duluth,"
where a principal water main leading from a reservoir burst near
plaintiff's premises, causing extensive damage.4°  The Minnesota
Supreme Court declined to base liability on trespass, but instead relied
squarely on Rylands.4' After noting the "immense quantities" of water
necessitated by large cities, the nature of "water systems on a vast
scale," and the severe damage inflicted on the plaintiff, the court
concluded,
In such a case, even though negligence be absent, natural justice would seem to
demand that the enterprise, or what really is the same thing, the whole
community benefitted by the enterprise, should stand the loss rather than the
individual. It is too heavy a burden upon one. The trend of modem legislation
is to relieve the individual from the mischance of business or industry without
regard to its being caused by negligence42 Our safety appliance acts and
workmen's compensation acts are examples.
This quotation reveals the court's endorsement of strict enterprise
liability and loss spreading, with virtually no prerequisite to potential
liability other than the implicit and inherent potential for extreme
damage should the main burst.
Finally, Bohlen cited repeatedly43 the opinion of the California
Supreme Court in Green v. General Petroleum Corp.,' involving the
blow-out of an oil well which cast oil, gas, mud, and rocks onto the
property located 200 feet from the well, destroying much of the
plaintiff's property.45 The court found that defendant was not negligent
because it used experienced workers and the best equipment, and
because the blow-out occurred at a depth much higher than previously
experienced in the area. After also rejecting liability based on nuisance
per se, the court nevertheless found liability without reliance on Rylands.
The court found liability based on a principle broader even than that of
Judge Blackburn in Rylands, writing,
37. Id.
38. See RESTATEMENT OF ToRrs §§ 519-520 (Reporter's Notes, 1938).
39. 197 N.W. 971 (Minn. 1924).
40. See id. at 972.
41. See id.
42. Id.
43. See RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs §§ 519-520 (Reporter's Notes, 1938).
44. 270 P. 952 (Cal. 1928).
45. See id. at 953.
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Where one, in the conduct and maintenance of an enterprise lawful and
proper in itself, deliberately does an act under known conditions, and, with
knowledge that injury may result to another, proceeds, and injury is done to the
other as the direct and proximate consequence of the act, however carefully
done, the one who does the act and causes the injury should, in all fairness, be
required to compensate the other for the damage done. The instant case offers a
most excellent example of an actual invasion of the property of one person
through the act of another. The fact that the act resulting in the 'blow-out' was
lawful, and not negligently done, does not, in our opinion, make the covering of
respondents' property with oil, sand, mud, and rocks any less an actual invasion
of and a trespass upon the premises.
It ought to be, and we are of the view that it is, the rule that, where an injury
arises out of, or is caused directly and proximately by the contemplated act or
thing in question, without the interposition of any external or independent
agency which was not or could not be foreseen, there is an absolute liability for
the consequential damage, regardless of any element of negligence either in the
doing of the act or in the construction, use, or maintenance of the object or
instrumentality that may have caused the injury. In our judgment, no other legal
construction can be placed upon the operations of the appellant in this case than
that, by its deliberate act of boring its well, it undertook the burden and
responsibility of controlling and confining whatever force or power it
uncovered. Any other construction would permit one owner, under like
circumstances, to use the land of another for his own purpose and benefit,
with.ut making compensation f6r such use. We do not conceive that to be the
law.
The foregoing represents the handful of decisions which Bohlen used
to develop the SLADA rule in the First Restatement of Torts. What can
be gleaned from these decisions are the following observations: (1) a
plaintiff could recover even though defendant was not negligent (i.e.,
despite evidence that the defendant exercised due care); (2) the
defendants found liable were all engaged in activities that proved to be
highly destructive (e.g., involving the inundation of plaintiff's home by a
bursting water main, an explosion of dynamite that destroyed plaintiff's
home and killed three people, the destruction of a plaintiff's dwelling by
a four to seven inches thick layer of rock and mud, or the collapsing of a
wall that damaged plaintiff's property); (3) oil drilling and dynamite
storage activities, each done in close proximity to residential housing,
were deemed to be inappropriately located; (4) a utility company may be
liable for damages resulting from a broken water main despite having
located the main in an appropriate place; (5) none of the activities from
which liability accrued was for a purpose "normal to the average man"
(i.e., the activity was not a matter of common usage); and (6) while the
activities of oil drilling and dynamite storage might be regarded as
46. Id. at 955.
creating a high risk of harm to others, a fire-gutted house and broken
water mains do not inherently suggest highly dangerous activity.
But what one really carries away from these decisions is a strong
sense of a burgeoning rule of strict enterprise liability.'7 The opinion of
the California Supreme Court in Green and of Augustus Hand in Exner
both exhibit strong inclination toward treating injuries inflicted on
innocent persons as a cost of doing business without regard to fault.
Moreover, returning to Bohlen's article on Rylands, it seems quite clear
that he too espoused precisely such a view. After observing that the
progeny of Rylands represented a compromise between conflicting
conceptions of public justice (liability only for fault and liability without
fault) and that such a compromise was indicative of a transition period in
the development of the law (which he likens to a bridge), Bohlen wrote,
[T]hey seem rather to be a bridge between the old conception and some new
solution of the problem of the proper distribution of the loss necessarily caused
by the individual activities of civilized mankind, each in pursuit of his own
interests. And as no one indefinitely remains upon a bridge, but either passes
over it upon his way or returns to the shore he has left, so it is to be expected
that the courts, which have in these cases parted company with the idea that no
person need make good the loss he innocently causes, will either return to that
principle, abandoning the position they now occupy, or that they will go on in
the path on which they have started and will work out some new principle for
the distribution of the lyas, which will satisfy the more highly socialised [sic]
modem sense of justice.
47. See generally Nolan & Ursin, supra note 5 (undertaking a careful
consideration of enterprise liability).
48. Bohlen, supra note 21, at 453. Bohlen makes this observation:
To throw the whole of the loss upon one member of the public, simply because
it is his misfortune that his property should be situated near to the place which
the defendant selects to carry on the business, tending to increase the general
prosperity, is, it seems to the writer, to throw upon him a loss altogether out of
proportion to his share in the benefit derived from the encouragement of the
industry.
If the public be interested, let the public as such bear the loss, but if the
neighbors have such profit by the business by reason of the fact that the right
to carry on such business adds value to their land, or because the value of their
land is enhanced by the character of the locality due to the presence of the
defendant's enterprise, then, they being peculiarly benefited, may be properly
singled out to bear the loss. Nor is it to the public interest to allow the business
even though it be one which conduces to the general prosperity, to be carried
on at the cost of the neighbor or of the public, unless the risks be so great that
no person be expected to engage in it on any other terms. The margin of profit
in a particular kind of business, which may be essential for the satisfaction of
some general want, may be so small, or this sort of business so in its infancy,
that certain privileges may well be accorded to it, but it is certainly not to the
public interest that he who carries on any business should be relieved from
bearing the burden of the damage which that business does, as part of the cost
of its operation, merely that his profits may be increased.
Id. at 444-46 (footnotes omitted).
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Does the black letter rule of the Restatement show fidelity to the
decisions it purports to "restate?" Does it carry out a theory of strict
enterprise liability? Sections 519 and 520 of the First Restatement
imposed strict liability on one who carried on an "ultrahazardous
activity." 9  An activity was considered ultrahazardous "if it (a)
necessarily involves a risk of serious harm to the person, land or chattels
of others which cannot be eliminated by the exercise of the utmost care,
and (b) is not a matter of common usage."50 The Restatement provided
that,
[O]ne who carries on an ultrahazardous activity is liable to another whose
person, land or chattels the actor should recognize as likely to be harmed by the
unpreventable miscarriage of the activity for harm resulting thereto from that
which makes the acgvity ultrahazardous, although the utmost care is exercised
to prevent the harm.
The first important consideration is the treatment of the exercise of
due care by the defendant. As noted above, in the pre-Restatement
decisions, and indeed in Rylands itself, the plaintiff was unable to prove
negligence-the record in those cases simply didn't support such a
finding. Section 519 accurately reflects that authority because it
imposes strict liability "although the utmost care is exercised to prevent
the harm.' 52  But section 520 takes that point one step further by
requiring that the risk be one "which cannot be eliminated by the
exercise of the utmost care., 53 This point is developed in detail in Part
Il[ because it is central to understanding the current rules under the
Restatement (Second). Suffice it to observe that the decisions relied on
by Bohlen stated that the plaintiff did not prove negligence in those
cases and was not required to do so, not that it would have been
impossible for him to do so. I think this is an incredibly important
distinction that finds virtually no support in the decisions since 1938. In
other words, it is one thing to say that the plaintiff was unable to prove
negligence; it is quite another to require that plaintiff establish that it is
impossible to prove negligence. The comments to the First Restatement
offer only a bit of clarification. Comment "a" to section 520 states:
49. See RFSTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 519-520 (1938).
50. Id. § 520.
51. Id. § 519.
52. Id.
53. Id. § 520.
The rule stated in this Section is applicable to an activity which is of such utility
that the risk unavoidably involved in carrying it on cannot be regarded as so
unreasonable as to make it negligent to carry it on, as the word "negligence" is
defined in § 282. If the utility of the activity does not justify the risk
inseparable from it, merely to carry it on is negligence, and the rule stated in
this Seq.ion is not necessary to subject the actor to liability for harm resulting
from it.
Comment "d," titled "Ultrahazardous conditions of operation" reads in
part, "An activity may be ultrahazardous because it is of a sort which
must be carried on under conditions which cannot be predicted at the
time it is entered upon and which, if they arise, are incapable of being so
provided against as to make the activity safe."55
These comments provide a glimpse of a rationale for the requirement
that the activity be one incapable of being made safe by the exercise of
utmost care. Bohlen uses aviation in several of the comments to
illustrate an activity that is ultrahazardous precisely because, in Bohlen's
words, "even the best constructed and maintained aeroplane is so
incapable of complete control that flying creates a risk that the plane
even though carefully constructed, maintained and operated, may crash
to the injury of persons, structures and chattels on the land over which
the flight is made." 6  Similarly, the storage and transportation of
explosive substances qualifies under section 520 for strict liability
because "no precautions and care can make it reasonably certain that
they will not explode."57  These illustrations suggest that it is the
inherent, unavoidable, unpreventable risk that essentially renders the
activity ultrahazardous. Without doubt Rylands contains no such
principle because the reservoir in that case contained no such
unpreventable risk, and Bohlen cites precious little authority to sustain
the rule.
The second thing that jumps out from the First Restatement is the
demand that the activity "necessarily involve[ ] a risk of serious harm"58
Here again the insistence on extreme or excessive danger goes beyond
Rylands (there being nothing of excessive danger inherent in a
reservoir); and, outside of the blasting cases (and perhaps the blow-out
of the oil well), the characterization of an activity as extremely
dangerous is not an essential ingredient in many pre-1938 cases. The
only examples of activities that qualify as an ultrahazardous activity
given in the comments are blasting, the storage, transportation, and use
54. Id. § 520 cmt. a.
55. Id. § 520 cmt. d (emphasis added).
56. Id. § 520 cmt. b (emphasis added).
57. Id. § 520 cmt. c.
58. Id. § 520.
[VOL. 36: 597, 1999] Strict Liability
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
of explosives, aviation, and the blow-out of oil wells. 9
The third observation, which is especially surprising, is the failure to
incorporate any requirement that the activity be unusual or inappropriate
to the place or surroundings where it is carried on. Not once do the
comments even allude to the non-natural user principle of Rylands.6
Moreover, Bohlen apparently excluded the principle despite cases such
as Exner, involving a magazine storing dynamite within a few hundred
feet of residential dwellings, and Green, with the oil well drilled less
than 200 feet from a home, that support the idea of locational
inappropriateness. In his article Bohlen makes very little reference to
the non-natural user principle even though the decisions, especially the
English ones, regard that point as central to whole basis of liability.'
Prosser, writing about the First Restatement in 1953, renders this
criticism:
This [Restatement] goes beyond the English rule in ignoring the place where the
activity is carried on and its surroundings, and falls short of it in the insistence
on extreme danger and the impossibility of eliminating it with all possible care.
This shift of emphasis to the nature of the activity itself rather than its relation
to its surroundings is not reflected in the American cases, which have lail 2quite
as much stress as the English ones upon the place where the thing is done.
Decisions rendered subsequent to the publication of the Restatement
of Torts have been vocal in their criticism of the rules' failure to
explicitly incorporate a locational appropriateness factor. Thus, a New
Mexico appellate court in a case involving storage of explosives stated:
59. See id. § 519 cmts. b-e. In his article, Bohlen refers repeatedly to "every
excessive use of a private right which in its nature threatens harm to others" and "[tihe
question whether the particular use is to be regarded as excessive or improper." Bohen,
supra note 21, at 431-32.
60. Recall that Bohlen candidly acknowledged in the early drafts that the
"Reporter has not stated the effect of the rule announced" in Rylands. RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS at 75 (Preliminary Draft No. 69, 1934).
61. See Bohlen, supra note 21, at 428-29. Bohlen continues,
Since the defendant's liability arises from the fact that he had in the course of
an unnatural use of his property and for purposes of his own, peculiar to
himself, collected thereon substances likely to escape and injurious if they do
escape, it follows that the plaintiff cannot recover where his only injury is the
interference with his equally unnatural and peculiar use of his own land.
Id.
62. PROSSER, supra note 15, at 158. Prosser would rectify the omission when he
became the Reporter for the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which is described infra Part
II.C.
We hold that strict liability in the storage of dynamite depends on the relation of
the storage to the surroundings; specifically, the storage must be "...
inappropriate to the place where it is maintained, in the light of the character of
that place and its surroundings."
These [first] Estatement rules seem to ignore the relation of the storage to
the surroundings.
Other cases have been equally committed to the locational consideration,
despite the First Restatement's exclusion of such a factor.64
The final consideration is the requirement of section 520 that the
activity not be a matter of common usage. Comment "e" to section 520,
before pointing out that blasting, the storage and use of explosives, and
oil drilling are not matters of common usage, explains:
An activity is a matter of common usage if it is customarily carried on by the
great mass of mankind or by many people in the community. It does not cease
to be so because it is carried on for a purpose peculiar to the individual who
carries it on. Certain activities may be so generally carried on as to be regarded
as customary. Thus, automobiles have come into such general use that their
operation is a matter of common usage. This, together with the fact that the risk
involved in the careful operation of a carefully maintained automobile is slight,
is sufficient to prevent their operation from being an ultrahazardous activity.
However, the use of an automotive vehicle of such size and weight as to be
incapable of safe control and to be likely to crush water and gas mains under the
surface of the highway is not as yet a usual means qf transportation and,
therefore, the use of such an automobile is ultrahazardous.
Furthermore, the Reporter's Notes state, "In the following cases
emphasis was laid upon the fact that the instrumentality which the
defendant used or the conditions which he created were used or created
for the defendant's own purposes and were not those which are
commonly used or created by the community at large." 66
But the quotations and authorities Bohlen includes to support that
proposition are all English cases and appear to deal primarily with
distinguishing between the abnormal, unusual, non-natural use of land,
and the "ordinary" 67 or "normal"6 use of the land. The kind of common
63. Otero v. Burgess, 505 P.2d 1251, 1255-56 (N.M. Ct. App. 1973) (quoting
WILLIAM PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 508 (4th ed. 1971)).
64. See, e.g., Yommer v. McKenzie, 257 A.2d 138 (Md. 1969) (holding that a
leaking underground storage tank was ultrahazardous despite Restatement provisions
because of its location near residential wells); Wheatland Irrigation Dist. v. McGuire,
537 P.2d 1128 (Wyo. 1975) (holding that where an irrigation ditch ruptured no strict
liability existed since it was in an appropriate location).
65. RESTATEMENT oF ToRTS § 520 cmt. e (1938).
66. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 7001-7002 explanatory notes at 12 (Preliminary
Draft No. 72, 1934).
67. See Rickards v. Lothian, 1 App. Cas. 263 (P.C. 1913) (appeal taken from
Austl.).
68. See Wilkins v. Leighton, 2 Ch. 106 (1932); West v. Bristol Tramways Co., 2
[VOL. 36: 597, 1999] Strict Liability
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
usage principle that is included in the black letter rule of section 520-
not a factor, but an essential condition-appears to differ from the non-
natural user principle that derived from Rylands. Later the Reporter's
Note refers to the storage of explosives as entailing absolute liability
because "it brings into the neighborhood an unpreventable risk which is
not usual to the community,"' 9 citing Exner v. Sherman Power
Construction Co.70 In addition, the Reporter explains that New York's
and New Jersey's early rejection of the rule from Rylands occurred in
cases involving steam generated from a boiler in an engine, which had
become a matter of common usage at the time of those decisions.
71
It appears, therefore, that Bohlen attempted to use the idea of
"common usage" as a substitute for, or better expression of, the non-
natural user principle that had been so prominent in the English cases
and which also received, as Prosser argued, substantial emphasis in
American decisions. But in doing so, Bohlen failed to capture the
importance of location or placement in relation to the land, person, or
chattels of others. Moreover, "common usage," defined as activities
"customarily carried on by the great mass of mankind,"' embraces so
few activities that, outside of automobile driving (the only example he
gives) and perhaps railroads, the provision really excludes very little. In
other words, taken literally, the provision rarely limits the range of
activity qualifying as ultrahazardous. Presumably, of course, that is
precisely what Bohlen had intended.
The common usage provision has also been subjected to criticism by
those who felt that the Restatement should have been applied to all
activities reasonably deemed ultrahazardous, especially those most
common ones-such as the operation of railroads, which were the cause of
the greatest harm to society.
In the aggregate, all four of the attacks leveled at the First Restatement
of Torts' effort to develop a hard rule of strict liability suggested a rocky
road ahead.
K.B. 14 (1908); Mayer v. Foster, 1 K.B. 167 (1905).
69. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 7001-7002 explanatory notes at 19 (Preliminary
Draft No. 73, 1935).
70. 54 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1931). Also cited is Bradford Glycerine Co. v. St. Marys
Woolen Mfg. Co., 54 N.E. 528 (Ohio 1899).
71. See Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476 (1873); Marshall v. Welwood, 38 N.J.L.
339 (1876).
72. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520 cmt. e. (1938).
73. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 5, at 1452; Nolan & Ursin, supra note 5, at 266.
C. The Restatement (Second) of Torts
William Prosser was the Reporter for the Restatement (Second) of
Torts. The first revisions he presented of sections 519 and 520 appear in
Preliminary Draft No. 9, dated December 19, 1958, submitted to the
Advisory Committee of the AL. 74 Of course, given Prosser's harsh
criticism of the First Restatement one could reasonably predict that he
would undertake a substantial rewriting of the rules-and that he did.
Prosser's first draft read as follows:
Section 519. General Principle
(1) One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability
for harm to the person, land or chattels of another resulting from the activity,
although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent such harm.
(2) The liability stated in subsection (1) is limited to
(a) Persons whom the actor should recognize as likely to be harmed by the
activity, and
(b) The kind of harm which he should recognize as likely to result from it.
Section 520. Definition of Abnormally Dangerous Activity
An activity is abnormally dangerous if it
(a) Necessarily involves a risk of serious harm to the person, land or
chattels of others, which cannot be eliminated by the
exercise of all reasonable care, and
(b) Is not a matter of common usage, and
(c) Is inappropriate to the place where it is carried on.
Several observations warrant mention. First, he dropped the term
"Ultrahazardous" in favor of "Abnormally Dangerous," which he
believed better described the concept. Second, he deleted the term
"miscarriage" from section 519 on grounds that miscarriage was the
wrong word since "[i]t is not necessary that anything should go wrong
with the activity" and "[i]f the harm results from its normal and ordinary
operation, there is still strict liability."76  Third, in comment "d" to
section 519 he clarified the rationale for imposing strict liability;
writing,
The liability stated in this Section is not based upon any intent of the defendant
to do harm to the plaintiff or to affect his interests, nor is it based upon any
negligence, either in attempting to carry on the activity itself in the first
instance, or in the manner in which it is carried on. The defendant is held liable
although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm to the plaintiff
74. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, ch. 21, Abnormally Dangerous
Activities (Preliminary Draft No. 9, 1958).
75. Id. at 56 (including Reporter's handwritten notes).
76. Id. § 519 at 55.
77. See id.
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that has ensued. The liability arises out of the abnormal danger of the activity
itself, and the risk that it creates, of harm to those in the vicinity. It is founded
upon a policy of the law that imposes upon anyone who for his own purposes
creates an abnormal risk of harm to his neighbors, the responsibility of relieving
against that harm when it does in fact occur. The defendant's enterprise, in
other words, is required to pay its way by compensating~or the harm it causes,
because of its special, abnormal and dangerous character.
This statement, of course, represents a classic expression of strict
enterprise liability. Fourth, he preserved the scope of liability provision
from the First Restatement that limits strict liability to the kind of harm
that made the activity ultrahazardous or abnormally dangerous. 9
Fifth, Prosser kept intact the provision that the plaintiff is excused
from establishing negligence ("although [the defendant] has exercised
the utmost care to prevent the harm")." Finally, Prosser carries over an
explicit requirement of foreseeability, at least as to the identity of the
injured person ("persons whom the actor should recognize as likely to be
harmed by the activity")." Considering all of these points, it would be
fair to say that Prosser's first draft constituted a major revision to section
519.
As to section 520, there were also some important changes. Prosser,
citing his article on Rylands,' first supports the substitution of
"abnormally dangerous" for "ultrahazardous. 83 In that connection, he
rejects the language of "utmost care," in favor of "all reasonable care,"
on the grounds that "[t]here is probably no activity, outside of the use of
atomic energy, which is not perfectly safe if the utmost care is used."4
. Second, Prosser's inclusion of an explicit requirement for locational
inappropriateness is significant. Prosser tells the advisers that "[i]t
stands out like a sore thumb from the cases that the important thing
about the activity is not that it is extremely dangerous per se, but that it
78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977). Although the quoted
statement is taken from the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 519, as published in
1977, apart from minor word corrections, this statement has remained intact since 1958.
79. This requirement has not proved to be particularly contentious. Both Bohlen
and Prosser believed that a proximate or legal causation principle similar to that applied
in negligence was essential. Compare RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 519 cmt. b (1938) with
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 cmt. e (1977).
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 cmt. d (1977).
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (Preliminary Draft No. 9, 1958).
82. See PROSSER, supra note 15.
83. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (Preliminary Draft No. 9, 1958).
84. Id. at 58.
is abnormally so in relation to its surroundings."85 Prosser then marshals
substantial authority, including of course Rylands itself, to support such
a revision to the black letter rule, drawing distinctions between the
storage of explosives in the city as compared to the middle of the desert,
the storage of large quantities of gasoline in a populated area versus in
an isolated area, the operation of oil and gas wells in thickly settled
communities versus in the open country, and the storage of water in a
dangerous place in a city rather than in a rural area. 6 Further, Prosser
points out that "there are cases in which strict liability has been imposed
upon activities not extremely dangerous in themselves, but abnormally
so because of their location and relationto their surroundings."' Thus,
drawing on a careful reading of the cases and his incredible talent at
classification, Prosser restored the "non-natural" user principle of
Rylands that Bohien had omitted, such effort reflecting Prosser's firm
conviction that such consideration is essential in determining liability.'
He concludes by stating that "we should discard 'ultrahazardous,' and
the ideas associated with it, and bring the Restatement into line with the
English rule."89
Third, it is important that Prossser chose to retain the requirement that
the activity's risk be one that "cannot be eliminated by the exercise of all
reasonable care."'  He explained that "[w]hat is meant here is the
unavoidable risk remaining even though the actor has taken all
reasonable precautions, and has exercised all reasonable care, so that he
is not negligent."'" Like Bohlen, he never points to any authority that
supports the proposition that the activity be one which involves risks that
are not preventable by exercising reasonable care, or that the plaintiff
must prove that negligence cannot be proved. This is especially
surprising given his criticism of the First Restatement for "fall[ing] short
of [the English rule] in the insistence on ... the impossibility of
eliminating it with all possible care."'
85. Id.
86. See id. at 65.
87. Id.
88. See id. at 58-60. In comment "h," he declares:
It is not sufficient for the application of the rule of strict liability that the
activity involves the kind of risk stated in Clause (a), and that it is not a matter
of common usage, as stated in Clause (b). It must also be carried on in a place
inappropriate to the particular activity.
Id. at 65 (emphasis added).
89. Id. at 61.
90. Id. at 63.
91. Id. Prosser points to blasting with dynamite and transporting it on a public
highway as abnormally dangerous "because of the unavoidable risk of explosion, even if
all reasonable care is used." Id.
92. PROSSER, supra note 15, at 158.
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Fourth, Prosser, with little comment, also retains the requirement that
the activity not be a matter of common usage. In this draft he adopts
Bohlen's comment on common usage virtually verbatim, and makes no
additional comments to the Advisers.93
The next version of sections 519 and 520 appeared in 1963 and was
titled "Council Draft No. 15."' Section 519 had undergone a bit of
tinkering since 1958, but nothing substantial or substantive, other than
deletion of an explicit foreseeability requirement. Section 519 read as
follows:
Section 519. General Principle
(1) One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability
for harm to the person, land or chattels of another resulting from the activity,
although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent such harm.
(2) Such strict liability is limited to the Ignd of harm, the possibility of which
makes the activity abnormally dangerous.
In contrast, section 520 had undergone very substantial revisions since
1958. It read as follows:
Section 520. Abnormally Dangerous Activities
In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the following
factors are to be considered:
a. The fact that the activity involves a high degree of risk of some harm
to the person, land or chattels or others;
b. The fact that gravity of the harm which results from it is likely to be great;
c. The fact that the risk cannot be eliminated by the exercise of reasonable care;
d. The fact that the activity is not a matter of common usage;
e. The place where it is carried on; and
f. The value of the activity to the community.
In his note to the council, Prosser points out that the advisers agreed
with his substantial changes.' After making his case for including
locational inappropriateness and for reinstating the "non-natural user"
principle of Rylands, Prosser concluded with this powerful observation:
93. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 at 64-65 (Preliminary Draft No.
9, 1958).
94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, ch. 21, Abnormally Dangerous Activities
(Council Draft No. 15, 1963).
95. Id. § 519 at 66.
96. Id. § 520 at 69 (emphasis added).
97. See id. at 72.
The Advisers all agree that "ultrahazardous" should be discarded. Since it
appears to be impossible to formulate a "definition" which will include both the
use of atomic energy and a water tank in the wrong place, the attempt is made to
state the Section in terms9pf factors to be taken into account, relying on the
comments for explanation.
Thus, in one brief statement he explains an extremely significant
transformation from listing the two essential elements of ultrahazardous
activity in the First Restatement to a six factor weighing process in
determining if an activity is abnormally dangerous in the Restatement
(Second). The only reason he offers for such a significant change is that
it is "impossible to formulate a 'definition' which will cover the myriad
kind of cases potentially involved."
The official comments to section 520 as set forth in Council Draft No.
15 and those later approved and published in 1977 are virtually
identical."° For that reason the discussion that follows makes reference
solely to the final official comments. Likewise, the final rules of the
Restatement (Second) contain only stylistic changes from those of Draft
No. 15. Sections 519 and 520 of the Restatement (Second) read as
follows:
Section 519. General Principles
(1) One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability
for harm to the person, land or chattels of another resulting from the activity,
although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent such harm.
(2) This strict liability is limited to the ljgd of harm, the possibility of which
makes the activity abnormally dangerous.
Section 520. Abnormally Dangerous Activities
In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the following
factors are to be considered:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or
chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and




100. A Tentative Draft No. 10 was submitted to the full American Law Institute,
and was the version debated by the membership at its annual meeting in 1964. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, ch. 21, §§ 519-520 at 52-68 (Tentative Draft No. 10,
1964) (containing no changes from Council Draft No. 15).
101. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 519 (1977).
102. Id. § 520.
620
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In May, 1964, the Institute membership considered and approved the
above language.'03 As to section 520, Prosser explained that he had
initially sought to fashion the section as a set of requirements with the
"primary test" being the "inappropriateness of the activity to the place
where it is carried on."'' 4 However, the Advisers had convinced him that
because nuclear fission is dangerous regardless of where it is
undertaken, that a locational test could not be an absolute requirement in
every case.' 5 Therefore, he opted for a set of factors to be weighed, with
the core idea being that the activity must be "substantially dangerous,"
"not slightly dangerous"--i.e., the activity must represent an "abnormal
danger... not usually encounter[ed].""' Prosser stated that he believed
the multi-factor approach was "unsatisfactory" and that he did "not like
this section" because of its indefiniteness, but that the Council "felt
rather helpless as to doing anything to improve it."'" Once he got
beyond that point, the remainder of the discussion dealt entirely with
section 520(f), the value of the activity to the community, which met
with substantial opposition, but nevertheless was approved.0 ' The
substance of that debate is further discussed below."°
Various portions of the official comments to section 520 warrant some
discussion. To begin with, Prosser emphasized that the activities to
which this section applies are typically unusual because the concept of
abnormal dangers implies atypicality or at least unusual risks associated
with usual activities."0 The point is that the strict liability of section 520
reaches the unusual, rare activity, not the commonplace."' Second,
Prosser emphasized the interdependence of the six factors, making the
following often-quoted statement:
In determining whether the danger is abnormal, the factors listed in Clauses (a)
to (f) of this Section are all to be considered, and are all of importance. Any one
of them is not necessarily sufficient of itself in a particular case, and ordinarily
several of them will be required for strict liability. On the other hand, it is not
103. See 41 A.L.I. PROC. 449-65 (1964). The discussion of Section 519 was
uneventful other than a short debate over the scope of the risk and the extent to which the
harm must be foreseeable. See id. at 451-55.
104. Id. at 455.
105. See id. at 455-56.
106. Id. at 456.
107. Id. at 457.
108. Id. at 458.
109. See infra notes 129-38 and accompanying text.
110. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmts. a, g (1977).
111. See 41 A.L.I. PROC. 456-58 (1964).
necessary that each of them be present, especially if others weigh heavily.
Because of the interplay of these various factors, it is not possible to reduce
abnormally dangerous activities to any definition. The essential question is
whether the risk created is so unusual, either because of its magnitude or
because of the circumstances surrounding it, as to justify the imposition of strict
liability for the harm that results from it, even though it is carried on with all
reasonable care. In other words, are its dangers and inappropriateness for the
locality so great that, despite any usefulness it may have for the community, it
should be required as a matter ?Llaw to pay for any harm it causes, without the
need of a finding of negligence.
As will be shown later, although the foregoing comment states that no
one factor is essential, in fact courts have treated factors (a), (b), and (c),
and especially (c), as indispensable, whereas (d), (e), and (f) have
received more mixed applications. But the quoted statement also, in the
last sentence, makes clear Prosser's strong commitment to the locational
inappropriateness of the activity, coupled with its dangerousness, which
together constitute for Prosser the core principles. The last sentence is
also significant because it does not say "negligence is incapable of being
proved," rather only that negligence is not necessary to be proved. As
was pointed out earlier, these are two different ideas, and Prosser does
not carefully draw the distinction between them.
Comment "g" ("Risk of harm"). explains clauses (a) and (b) of
section 520. It speaks of a "high degree of risk of serious harm.' ' 14
Prosser again points out that, in determining if a given activity imposes a
major risk, it may be "necessary to take into account the place where the
activity is conducted."
15
Comment "h" ("Risk not eliminated by reasonable care")" 6 recognizes
the centrality of negligence law. Most activities, after all, can be
rendered safe by exercising reasonable care, and, if they cannot be made
safe with such care, that fact alone implies an abnormal danger. But
section 520, it continues, does not mean that "the risk be one that no
conceivable precautions or care could eliminate,"' 1 7 but rather what is
intended is that there be some residual risk after the exercise of due care,
the actor therefore being non-negligent."' Thus, the activity is assumed
to be of high utility and wholly justified, there being by definition no
negligence in carrying it on. The inherent, unavoidable risk, however,
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. f (1977) (emphasis added).
113. Id. § 520 cmt. g.
114. Id.
115. Id. The comment uses as an illustration a ten-ton tractor engine on a public
highway that crushes the conduits beneath it, which is covered by strict liability only
because of its location. See id.
116. Id. § 520 cmt. h.
117. Id.
118. See id.
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"requires that it be carried on at his peril, rather than at the expense of
the innocent person who suffers harm as a result of it."" 9
The "common usage" factor is explained in comment "i.' 20  This
comment indicates that an ultrahazardous activity does not include one
carried on by "the great mass of mankind or by many people in the
community.'' Prosser illustrates this notion by distinguishing between
the driving of regular automobiles (a matter of common usage that
possesses a residue of unavoidable risk of serious harm, but is
nonetheless exempt from strict liability) and the driving of some other
vehicle of such size and weight as to be too difficult to control or drive
safely.'2 So too blasting, the manufacture, storage and use of
explosives, and oil drilling are all matters that are deemed to be not
commonly engaged in.'2'
Prosser's emphasis on locational inappropriateness is addressed in
comment ji," 21 which points out that even blasting or a magazine of
high explosives is not abnormally dangerous if located where the risk of
harm to others would be minimal.'25 Calling the factor one of
"importance," the comment seeks fidelity to the English cases and the
principle of non-natural uses.'26 Finally, the comment points out that
some dangerous activities, such as oil drilling and coal mining, can only
be conducted at particular locations.' 27 As to these activities, they are
said to be not necessarily abnormally dangerous if they are of significant
value to the community,'n a notion more fully flushed out in section
520(f).
Section 520(f), which asks whether the value to the community
outweighs the risks of the activity, engendered substantial opposition
among the Institute's members.'29 Comment "k"' 30 notes that if the
activity occupies some importance to the community and the
community's prosperity depends upon it, then notwithstanding the
119. Id.









129. See 41 A.L.I. PROC. 458-60 (1964).
130. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oFTORTS § 520 cmt. k (1977).
serious risks posed, the activity will escape strict liability.' At the
Annual Meeting debating this section Professor Fleming expressed
concern that factor (f) "might actually become the lever for destroying
the whole purpose of this strict liability.' ' 2 The Vice President of ALI
expressed a similar sentiment, observing that the reservoir in Rylands
had value to the community but the opinion took no account of it.'33
Prosser responded that the reason coal mining in Pennsylvania and oil
wells in Texas are not subject to strict liability is because of their
importance to the community." 4 While admitting that he "would be
happy to throw it out," the cases would not support his doing so.'
Professor Page Keeton joined in the attack, arguing that the whole
rationale for strict liability is that socially desirable enterprises should
pay for the injuries they cause and that "the comments on 520 almost
wipe out strict liability for a socially desirable enterprise."'36 Professor
Robert Keeton contended that factor (e) (concerning locational
appropriateness) already protects community interests, thereby rendering
factor (f)'s separate consideration of value to the community
unnecessary.'37 Following a statement by Mr. Eldridge in support of
Prosser arguing that the cases clearly require inclusion of the value of
the activity to the community, the motion to delete section 520(f) was
defeated on a voice vote.
38
1. Bohlen v. Prosser
It may be useful to compare and contrast the first and second
Restatements, with a view to recognizing the different conception which
Bohlen and Prosser had of what should be the purpose and goals of the
doctrine. First, it is clear that Bohlen's conception of ultrahazardous
activities was considerably broader than the English conception
epitomized by Rylands and its domestic progeny. In England, strict
liability was limited to adjacent land owners; the doctrine of Rylands
was and is viewed as a species of nuisance. In contrast, Bohlen's
perception was that the "Americanized" version was not limited to
nuisance-type cases, but reached harm to "person, land, or chattels" of
131. See id.
132. 41 A.L.I. PROC. 458 (1964).
133. See id. at 459-60 ("I fear this subparagraph (f) may be relied upon... by a
court, to destroy the effect of the other factors ... .
134. See id. at 461.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 462. Page Keeton moved that factor (f) be removed from section 520.
See id.
137. See id.
138. See id. at 463.
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another wholly apart from interests in real property. This explains why
Bohlen's note to the advisers made it abundantly clear at the outset that
ultrahazardous-activity liability was not based on Rylands. In contrast,
Prosser believed in a closer fidelity to Rylands and nuisance situations.
His criticisms of the First Restatement are leveled at Bohlen's departure
from the central holding of Rylands. Prosser's affinity to nuisance is
reflected in his declaration that, even in states not expressly adopting
Rylands, an equivalent holding existed under the banner of absolute
nuisance. 139
Bohlen's inclusion of a common usage element also reflects his belief
that liability for ultrahazardous activities should not be limited to
nuisance-type cases. The non-natural user doctrine of Lord Cairns was
manifestly directed toward use of real property and the propriety of
defendant's activities in relation to contemporaneous and neighboring
land uses. Therefore, Bohlen had to articulate a broader principle that
would extend beyond landowner situations to reach those injured in
contexts unrelated to real property. This he accomplished through the
use of the phrase, "not a matter of common usage," although that
expression does not appear in the cases to embrace both the locational
inappropriateness idea of Rylands and dangerous activities unrelated to
real property. But the common-usage formulation was also necessary to
exempt automobiles and railroads and perhaps steam boilers from
liability. The English authorities never would have applied Rylands to
such activities in the first place because such activities do not
inextricably involve nuisance principles.
Prosser, of course, attacks Bohlen for ignoring the locational
inappropriateness and the non-natural user ideas.' 4° It isn't that Bohlen
so much ignored them, as that he viewed them as inadequate to the task
of limiting a much broader basis of liability. Prosser, therefore, felt
compelled to reincorporate the nuisance principle of an activity's
relationship to surrounding property as a separate element (or factor).'
4'
Prosser reiterated his belief that locational appropriateness or
inappropriateness is the core concept behind both Rylands and, more
importantly, the later American decisions.'42 But if that's true, why did
139. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 78, at 552 (5th ed. 1984)
[hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
140. See PROSSER, supra note 15, at 147.
141. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 520(d) (1977).
142. See id. § 520 cmts. g, h; PROSSER, supra note 15, at 147.
he carry forward the "not a matter of common usage" factor? Because
Prosser wanted to accurately reflect the decisional authority subsequent
to 1938 that had relied on the common usage formulation, he
begrudgingly, in my view, had to retain Bohlen's formulation. But, of
course, one method of minimizing the influence of the common-usage
qualification was to relegate it to the status of a "factor," rather than
making it a requirement as did the First Restatement.
Bohlen's formulation of ultrahazardous activity contained no
consideration, at least explicitly, for the value of the activity to the
community, beyond the common usage test. Prosser in contrast, as we
have seen, believed that separate consideration of the public benefits
conferred by the activity was necessary to faithfully reflect the decisions
-especially decisions that had rejected the doctrine of Rylands. In this
effort, he met strong opposition from his colleagues.'43 Bohlen, as we
have also seen, held to a strong commitment to strict enterprise
liability.'"T In his 1911 article, he flatly declared that if the activity
produced substantial public benefits, then all the more reason that the
public should compensate the innocently-injured plaintiff by rendering
the defendant liable. 45  While Prosser certainly manifested his own
commitment to strict enterprise liability (such manifestation being most
frequently associated with section 402A of the Restatement (Second)), '
6
and, while the comments to section 519 and section 520 do reveal a bit
of that philosophy, quite clearly Prosser felt that the decisional authority
warranted only a very constrained version of strict liability.
In summary, Bohlen's conception of strict liability was bolder, more
revolutionary, and closer to that which would illuminate products
liability thirty years later; Prosser's conception was more rooted in
history, more limited, more of a true "restatement" of the law. After all,
Bohlen acknowledged that little authority supported his formulation for
ultrahazardous activity,1 47 a fact that produced heavy criticism from
Prosser and from some courts. Prosser may have been willing to stake
out a near revolutionary position on products liability,1'8 but he was not
willing to do so as to abnormally dangerous activities.
In the decisions that followed in the wake of the Restatement
(Second), it is evident that the American judiciary had embraced
Prosser's more modest doctrine. The cases which we will soon consider
have confined strict liability under sections 519 and 520 to a relatively
143. See supra notes 129-38 and accompanying text.
144. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
146. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1977).
147. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
148. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1977).
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narrowly defined set of activities, and have otherwise looked to the law
of negligence as the basis of liability for such matters.
2. Keeton v. Prosser
In 1984 Page Keeton revised Prosser's treatise.' In the section
covering this topic he retained what Prosser had included in the 1971
edition, but then added a couple of pages entitled, "Recent
Developments and Reviser's Comments."'"5 In his comments Keeton
states that the Restatement (Second)'s attempt to combine Prosser's
commitment to the "non-natural" user principle with those contained in
the First Restatement was "unsatisfactory."'' He lodged essentially
three basic criticisms. First, he prefers the First Restatement's "well-
understood" requirements to the Restatement (Second)'s set of factors,
which, he notes, defeat predictability and therefore promote unnecessary
litigation.'52 Second, consistent with his remarks at the ALI proceedings
twenty years earlier, he strongly objects to the inclusion of factor (f)-
value of the activity to the community-on the grounds that these are
obviously useful activities, otherwise it would be unreasonable to carry
them on, and that their value to the community is "irrelevant on whether
or not a risk should be allocated to the defendant because of the
dangerousness, as such, of the activity."'53 Thus, Keeton writes, the net
149. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 139.
150. Id. § 78, at 554-56.
151. Id. at 555.
152. See id. at 555-56.
153. Id. at 555. Keeton's objection here is shared by the other leading torts treatise.
See 3 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 14.4, at 213-14 (2d ed. 1986).
This treatise states,
Among the factors to be considered, one deserves special note, the value of the
activity to the community. In a sense this factor has already been discounted
in making the decision to impose strict liability on an activity. Thus in
Comment b to § 520 it is explained, in distinguishing strict liability from
negligence: "The rule stated in § 519 is applicable to an activity which is
carried on with all reasonable care, and which is of such utility that the risk
which is involved in it cannot be regarded as so great or so unreasonable as to
make it negligence to carry on the activity at all.... If the utility of the
activity does not justify the risk which it creates, it may be negligence merely
to carry it on, and the rule stated in this Section is not necessary to subject the
defendant to liability to harm resulting from it."
The justification for strict liability, in other words, is that useful but
dangerous activities must pay their own way. There is nothing in this
reasoning that would exempt very useful activities from the rule, as is shown
by the granting of compensation even where the activity is of such paramount
result of Prosser's six factors is to render the whole legal undertaking as
"virtually the same thing as is done with the negligence concept."'-"
Keeton's third objection is more philosophical: Keeton is clearly
committed to a broader scope of enterprise responsibility than Prosser,
and rejects the host of qualifications and limitations set forth in the
Restatement (Second) that frustrate his distributive beliefs. After
endorsing a broad principle of enterprise responsibility, he concludes
that such a rule "seems to best describe the result of most recent
cases.""' s As is shown below, this conclusion in fact finds modest
support at most from the recent cases. The inference is unmistakable
that Keeton would take the theory of liability much closer to Bohlen's
conception than Prosser's. The courts, however, as is demonstrated
below, have moved in just the opposite direction.
Ill. DOCTRINAL BARRIERS TO STRICT LIABILITY
A. Introduction
Virtually every law student is exposed to SLADA and to sections 519
and 520 of the Restatement (Second). But it is readily apparent to the
student of these provisions that "strict liability" in this context isn't so
"strict." The purpose of this section is to discuss the difference between
(a) negligence (what a SLADA plaintiff need not-and indeed cannot-
prove, (b) SLADA strict liability, and (c) what might be called "true"
strict liability.
Certainly section 519 purports to apply a strict liability principle
importance to society that it justifies the exercise of eminent domain. And if
the law were to embrace wholly the principle of strict liability and its
underlying rationale, there would be no place for the consideration of this
factor. But this is not the present case. Tort law today contains two opposing
strains or principles, strict liability and liability based on fault. It is not
surprising, therefore, that any attempt to draw a line between them (which is
being done in § 520) should contain factors that would be irrelevant if one
principle or the other alone were being consistently pursued.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
154. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 139, at 555.
155. Id. at 556. Keeton states,
If an enterpriser deliberately and consciously engages in an activity that is
highly dangerous even when reasonable care is exercised and if the activity is
one that is not the kind commonly engaged in such as automobile driving, then
such intentional exposure of another to great danger, however socially
desirable the activity, can generally be regarded as a sound basis on which to
allocate the risk of loss to the person or entity engaging in that ultra-hazardous
and abnormally dangerous activity. This seems to best describe the result of
most recent cases.
Id.
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because, in cases where the defendant has engaged in an activity that is
classified as "abnormally dangerous," the plaintiff is explicitly excused
from the burden of proving negligence. Section 520, as we have seen,
provides the criteria by which this class of activities is to be determined.
A cursory glance at these six considerations reveals that this form of
strict liability crafted by Prosser is a strange one at that. The factors set
forth in subsections (d), (e), and (f) clearly manifest a weighing of sorts
that allows the defendant to offer an array of exculpatory evidence-a
situation contrary to the usual notion of strict liability.
It is one thesis of this Article that factors (d) and (e) are entirely
appropriate for inclusion in the adjudicatory calculus, but that factor (f)
is not; and that, on examination, the decisions in the last thirty years
support precisely that conclusion. The reason why factors (d) and (e) are
appropriate is that both bear immediately upon the question of the
excessively dangerous nature of the activity. Further, an examination of
the evolution of the doctrine of SLADA reinforces the propriety of these
considerations. By contrast, factor (f)-concerning the consideration of
the general utility to the community-finds little historical basis and
even less doctrinal justification. As discussed, clause (f) of section 520
was adopted in the face of substantial opposition. However, while
incorporation of the degree of common usage and locational propriety is
appropriate, and courts do give them some deference, in the ultimate
analysis these factors are rarely ever outcome-determinative. The reason
is that factor (c)-the inability to eliminate the risk by due care-drives
both the analysis and the outcome. As we shall see, when this factor
weighs in favor of applying strict liability, the courts will generally
apply strict liability.
A glance at factors (a), (b), and (c) reveals a striking similarity to the
Carroll Towing 5 test in which negligence is to be assessed under the
PL>B calculus, where "P" is the probability or likelihood of the harm
occurring, "L" is the gravity of that harm if it does occur, and "B" is the
burden or effort required to reduce or eliminate that risk of harm.'57 Like
the plaintiff in a negligence action, the SLADA plaintiff is obligated to
prove the "P" and "L"--but with a difference: the "P" and "L" here must
be extremely high. That is, the plaintiff must show that the activity
poses a "high degree of risk of some harm" and that the resulting harm
"will be great." Accordingly, the SLADA plaintiff must offer evidence
156. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d. Cir. 1947).
157. See id. at 173.
629
from which a court can reasonably infer that the activity is one that is
"abnormally" or "unusually" or "atypically" dangerous, a situation not
demanded by the law of negligence. Negligence law does not require
that PL be particularly high before a cause of action can accrue. Rather,
the law of negligence simply affords a remedy whenever the defendant
causes some harm and the cost to have prevented the harm is less than
PL-this without regard to the magnitude of PL.
Factor (c) exhibits some of the flavor of negligence law by addressing
the burden of preventing the harm. However, in the SLADA context,
the "B" from the formula is by definition infinite. That is to say, no
amount of care, no expenditures for prevention or precaution, would be
wholly successful in preventing the harm. Thus, a SLADA plaintiff
must offer evidence of burden as in a negligence case, but that evidence,
instead of pointing toward minimal burdens points in the opposite
direction-toward excessive, even impossible burdens. Therefore, using
Carroll Towing terms, "PL" is less than "B" (PL<B). In other words, in
the SLADA context, the point isn't that plaintiff should not have to
prove negligence; rather, it is that a plaintiff cannot prove negligence. It
is quite clear that such a requirement differentiates SLADA from other
pockets of strict liability in the law of torts where a plaintiff is excused
from proof of negligence for essentially policy reasons, as in strict
products liability for manufacturing defects,' or strict liability in public
nuisance cases, 159 or in statutory actions, such as workers'
compensation'O and CERCLA 6' In the SLADA context, unlike in any
other area of strict liability, the plaintiff must prove that negligence
cannot be proved. In this sense SLADA is a kind of default liability that
is only triggered when a negligence regime is ruled out-not on the
basis of policy, but on the basis of the evidence in the case. It seems
pretty clear that the availability of a SLADA cause of action will be
fairly limited because, in the vast majority of situations, a plaintiff will
be able to prove negligence because some amount of care exercised by
the defendant would have prevented the injury.
One final point bears mention. Virtually all courts and both
Restatements have taken the position that whether an activity qualifies
as ultrahazardous or abnormally dangerous is a question of law for the
court. "' This, too, is a strange phenomenon because it relegates to the
jury the issue of damages only. I think that this fact-i.e., that courts
158. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1977); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2a (1998) (manufacturing defects).
159. See RESTATEMENT(SEcOND) OFTORTS § 821 (1977).
160. See 3 FOWLER V. HARPER Er AL., supra note 153, § 14.4.
161. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994 & Supp. Im 1997).
162. See RESTATEMENTOFTORTs § 520 cmt. h, 1 (1977).
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rather than juries resolve the SLADA liability issue-has also
contributed to the limited utility of the SLADA doctrine.
I now examine those decisions decided under the Restatement
(Second) of Torts to assess how the courts have dealt with each of the
factors set forth in section 520.
B. The Decisions Demand the Impossibility of Proving Negligence
We now turn to the core issue of this Article: the propriety of the
limiting by definition the range of abnormally dangerous activities to
those for which the risk cannot be eliminated by the exercise of due care.
Stated differently, is the non-preventable nature of the risk merely a
factor for consideration or is it an indispensable requirement for finding
that an activity is abnormally hazardous? A review of the cases reveals
overwhelmingly that this is the crux of the liability issue-"where the
rubber meets the road." As discussed, the plaintiff bringing a SLADA
claim must prove that she cannot prove negligence-i.e., that the
negligence regime would necessarily be inadequate under the
circumstances. In reality this is an incredible burden that the vast
majority of litigants cannot surmount. What began in Rylands as the
plaintiff's failure to prove negligence has unquestionably hardened into
a rule that negligence must be impossible to prove before a court will
allow a SLADA claim. Bohlen's little twist on the holdings became, in
time, a virtual bar to liability under the SLADA doctrine. But why?
Let's look at a sample of the decisions that have explicitly considered
this question with some thoughtfulness. Perhaps the most exhaustive
treatment of factor (c) of section 520 and the interrelationshp between
SLADA and negligence is Judge Richard Posner's opinion in Indiana
Harbor Belt Railroad v. American Cyanamid Co.163 A railroad switching
line brought suit against a chemical manufacturer to recover the costs of
decontamination measures ordered by the Illinois Department of
Environmental Protection when a railroad tank car containing the highly
toxic chemical acrylonitrile leaked and spilled. The district court held
that the shipper of the chemical was strictly liable under the terms of
sections 519 and 520. The Seventh Circuit reversed. At the outset
Judge Posner explained that the six factors of section 520 represent a
"common quest for a proper legal regime to govern accidents that
163. 916 F.2d 1174 (7th Cir. 1990).
negligence liability cannot adequately control."' 4 He, however, started
with section 520(c), pointing out that the "baseline common law regime
of tort liability is negligence. [And when] it is a workable regime,
because the hazards of the activity can be avoided by being careful
(which is to say, non negligent), there is no need to switch to strict
liability."' 65 He continued,
By making the actor strictly liable-by denying him in other words an excuse
based on his inability to avoid accidents by being more careful-we give him an
incentive, missing in a negligence regime, to experiment with methods of
preventing accidents that involve not greater exertions of care, assumed to be
futile, but instead relocating, changing, or itucing (perhaps to the vanishing
point) the activity giving rise to the accident.
Finding precedent unhelpful, he continued his analysis of why clause
(c) cannot be met in this case:
To begin with, we have been given no reason, whether the reason in Siegler or
any other, for believing that a negligence regime is not perfectly adequate to
remedy and deter, at reasonable cost, the accidental spillage of acrylonitrile
from rail cars. Acrylonitrile could explode and destroy evidence, but of course
did not here, making imposition of strict liability on the theory of the Siegler
decision premature. More important, although acrylonitrile is flammable even
at relatively low temperatures, and toxic, it is not so corrosive or otherwise
destructive that it will eat through or otherwise damage or weaken a tank car's
valves although they are maintained with due (which essentially means, with
average) care. No one suggests, therefore, that the leak in this case was caused
by the inherent properties of acrylonitrile. It was caused by carelessness-
whether that of the North American Car Corporation in failing to maintain or
inspect the car properly, or that of Cyanamid in falling to maintain or inspect it,
or that of the Missouri Pacific when it had custody of the car, or that of the
switching line itself in falling to notice the ruptured lid, or some combination of
these possible failures of care. Accidents that are due to a lack of care can be
prevented by taking care; and when a lack of care can (unlike Siegler) be shown
in court, such accidents are adequately deterred by the threat of liability for
negligence.
... The question is, how likely is this type of accident if the actor uses due
care? For all that appears from the record of the case or any other sources of
information that we have found, if a tank car is carefully maintained the danger
of a spill of acrylonitrile is negligible. If this is right, there is no compelling
reason to move to a regime of strict liability, especiqy one that might embrace
all other hazardous materials shipped by rail as well.
This lengthy quotation demonstrates beyond doubt that section 520
liability is available only in those rare instances when the plaintiff
164. Id. at 1177.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1179 (citations omitted). The reference is to Siegler v. Kuhlman, 502
P.2d 1181 (Wash. 1972) (en banc), in which the court iniposed strict liability on a truck
carrying gasoline that blew up, killing the driver, and destroying, as a result of an
explosion, any evidence necessary to prove negligence.
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demonstrates the impossibility of proving negligence. In Indiana
Harbor Belt the plaintiff simply failed to show that due care would not
have prevented the accident causing plaintiff's harm.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in a somewhat briefer analysis holding
that contamination from underground storage tanks (USTs) was not
subject to strict liability, declared:
USTs, while admittedly disfavored under today's environmental laws, are
not inherently dangerous. Absent negligence or application of an outside force,
use of a UST does not create a high degree of risk of harm to the person, land[,]
or chattels of another. Moreover, those risks that do exist can be minimized by
the exercise of reasonable care by the owner or possessor of the tank. As one
court has noted: "if an activity can be performed safely with ordinary care,
negligence serves both as an adequate remedy for injury and a sufficient
deterrent to carelessness. Strict liability is reserved for selected uncommon and
extraordinarily dangpus activities for which negligence is an inadequate
deterrent or remedy."
The New York Court of Appeals, in a case involving damage to
plaintiffs' properties from a hydraulic landfill project, concluded that the
record contained insufficient evidence for making the determination of
whether the city's activity was abnormally dangerous.'69 In criticizing
the absence of record evidence and the lower courts' conclusions that
strict liability did apply to the landfill method used by defendant, it
commented,
There is little if any information, for example, of the degree to which
hydraulic landfilling poses a risk of damage to neighboring properties. Nor is
there data on the gravity of any such danger, or the extent to which the danger
can be eliminated by reasonable care. Basic to the inquiry, but not to be found
in the record, are the availability p]d relative cost, economic and otherwise, of
alternative methods of landfilling.
What is significant is that the New York court held that the record must
contain substantial evidence regarding alternative methods of landfilling
as a predicate to deciding if the due care could have avoided the risks of
harm and, therefore, as a precondition to finding the activity abnormally
dangerous.
168. Grube v. Daun, 570 N.W.2d 851, 857 (Wis. 1997) (quoting Arlington Forest
Assoc. v. Exxon Corp., 774 F. Supp. 387, 390 (E.D. Va. 1991)) (emphasis added).
169. See Doundoulakes v. City of Hempstead, 368 N.E.2d 24 (N.Y. 1977).
170. Id. at 27. The court did observe that "strict liability treatment may be
appropriate." Id. However, on remand the issue of negligence was to be submitted to
the jury, and its resolution would determine if strict liability could be applied. See id. at
30.
Consider the New Hampshire Supreme Court case of Bagley v.
Controlled Environment Corp.,'7 involving the release of hazardous
chemicals from defendant's property that contaminated plaintiff's soil
and groundwater. In an opinion by Justice Souter (now a U.S. Supreme
Court Justice), the court explained the critical role of proving the
unavailability of negligence, stating,
Good arguments could have been made for the existence of abnormal danger in
the operation of the amusement ride in Siciliano, the maintenance of the high
voltage power line in Wood and, probably, the maintenance of the dam in
Moulton. We nonetheless refused to extend strict liability to cover the claims of
the plaintiffs in each of those cases, and we held in effect that the abnormally
dangerous nature of the activity could be addressed adequately either in
determining the precaution that reasonable care would demand, or in requiring
conformance to statutory mandates.
We follow those cases today and decline to impose strict liability in the
absence of any demonstration that the requirement to prove legal fault acts as a
practical barrier to otherwise meritorious claims. With respect to the dumping
of the waste products and the leakage of soline in this case, there is no
apparent impossibility of proving negligence.
This language couldn't be clearer: The plaintiff must demonstrate that
proving negligence is an evidentiary impossibility.
Consider also the ruling of a California Court of Appeal in Edwards v.
Post Transportation Co.173 Here, in a personal injury action, the plaintiff
alleged that he was injured when one of defendant's drivers pumped
sulfuric acid into the wrong tank in a waste treatment facility, leading to
a severe chemical reaction that released toxic gas. In affirming the trial
court's refusal to submit the strict liability issue to the jury, the court
resoundingly declared the preeminence of clause (c) of section 520, and,
after having found that clauses (a) and (b) were satisfied in this case,
wrote,
Plaintiff loses his case, however, with the application of factor (c). The issue
posed by factor (c) is whether the risk involved in an admittedly dangerous
activity can be eliminated through the exercise of reasonable care. The same
experts who testified to the dangerous attributes of the acid were in agreement
that the actual risk of harm to people could be eliminated by the use of proper
handling procedures. One plaintiff's expert, a civil engineer and "sanitarian,"
agreed that "If... sulfuric acid is handled in a proper fashion, it is no danger."
Since sulfuric acid is governmentally classified as a hazardous material, its
transporters must be specially classified or registered. It appears, however, that
such regulation, including special training, is designed to and does eliminate the
special risk related to handling the acid. The fact that the material "requires
special handling" and one must "be careful with it," as plaintiff's expert
171. 503 A.2d 823 (N.H. 1986).
172. Id. at 826 (citing Siciliano v. Capitol City Shows, Inc., 475 A.2d 19 (N.H.
1984); Word v. Public Service Co., 317 A.2d 576 (N.H. 1974); Moulton v. Groveton
Papers Co., 289 A.2d 68 (N.H. 1972)) (emphasis added).
173. 279 Cal. Rptr. 231 (Ct. App. 1991).
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testified, leads to the logical conclusion that risk can be eliminated through care.
This conclusion undermines the argument that the use of sulfuric acid
should lead to strict liability. The theory of imposition of strict liability for
ultrahazardous activity is that the danger cannot be eliminated through the use
of care. Since the activity is in some sense beneficial, useful or necessary to
society, the actor is not deemed negligent simply for engaging in it. Damage
resulting to others, however, is taxed to the actor because he is the person who
most logically should bear the cost. Where the activity is dangerous only if
insufficient care is exercised, ordinary rules of fault are sufficient for allocation
of the risk. There is no need for liability without proof of fault, because
definitionally if Were is damage it will have resulted from negligence and will
be compensable.
Finally, an Indiana Court of Appeals also barred strict liability when
plaintiffs sustained injuries from raw chlorine gas that escaped from
defendant's plant that used chlorine gas in the manufacture of liquid
household bleach. In Erbrich Products Co. v. Wills,'75 after pointing out
that liability under section 519 is premised on activities "presenting risks
which cannot be eliminated by reasonable care," '176 the court wrote,
Unlike blasting operations or crop dusting where the chances of damage or
injury are inevitable despite the amount of care taken, the manufacture of
household bleach with chlorine gas does not encompass the same unavoidable
mishaps. The exercise of reasonable care would negate the risk of chlorine gas
escaping into the atmosphere. At oral argument, counsel for the plaintiffs
contended that the incident on October 12, 1984, would not have occurred but
for Erbrich's fans within their plant which blew the chlorine gas outside. This
reinforces our opinion that reasonable care could have avoided the incident.
Therefore, s~jct liability under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 519 is
inapplicable.
The foregoing cases are merely illustrative of dozens of recent
opinions that contain similar declarations, albeit more briefly or with
little analysis, establishing that section 520(c) is outcome-determinative
because strict liability applies-but only if the negligence system cannot
operate on the facts of the case." It is particularly interesting that in
174. Id. at 234-35.
175. 509 N.E.2d 850 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).
176. Id. at 856.
177. Id. at 857. In a footnote the court stated: "Although we do not ignore the other
factors enumerated in Section 520, we feel that the concept of § 520(c) is at the core of
§ 519 liability." Id. at 857 n.3.
178. In the following decisions (listed chronologically), all of which were decided
subsequent to publication of Tentative Draft No. 10 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
section 519 and section 520 (approved by the ALI in 1964), the courts have explicitly
considered section 520(c) and the relationship to negligence. See Beck v. Bel Air
Properties, Inc., 286 P.2d 503, 508 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955); Liber v. Flor, 415 P.2d 332
(Colo. 1966); Yommer v. McKenzie, 257 A.2d 138, 140 (Md. 1969); Siegler v.
Erbrich Products and Edwards what sunk the plaintiff's strict liability
claims under sections 519 and 520 was expert testimony that due care
could have prevented the accident. While some alternative theories of
liability are not mutually exclusive (for example, trespass and private
nuisance) and thus proof of one does not preclude the other, the unique
form of SLADA under the Restatement (Second) formulation, as a
practical matter, renders strict liability inapplicable in any case where
the plaintiff offers proof of negligence or could have done so.
In a few recent decisions, the application of section 520(c) has not
stood as a bar to strict liability. Thus, in a couple of opinions by the
Washington Supreme Court, one involving crop dusting and the other an
Kuhlman, 502 P.2d 1181, 1186-87 (Wash. 1972) (en banc); Cities Serv. Co. v. Florida,
312 So. 2d 799, 803 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Hudson v. Peavy Oil Co., 566 P.2d 175,
177-78 (Or. 1977); Doundoulakis v. Town of Hempstead, 368 N.E.2d 24, 27-28 (N.Y.
1977); Rodgers v. City of Loving, 573 P.2d 240, 241 (N.M. Ct. App. 1977); Langan v.
Valicopters, Inc., 567 P.2d 218, 222 (Wash. 1977) (en banc); Yukon Equip., Inc. v.
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 585 P.2d 1206, 1209-10 (Alaska 1978); Kent v. Gulf State Util.
Co., 418 So. 2d. 493, 498 (La. 1982); State DEP v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150 (N.J.
1983); Mahowald v. Minnesota Gas Co., 344 N.W.2d 856, 862-63 (Minn. 1984) (by
implication); New Meadows Holding Co. v. Washington Water Power Co., 687 P.2d
212, 216 (Wash. 1984) (en banc); Bagley v. Controlled Env't Corp., 503 A.2d 823, 826
(N.H. 1986); Erbrich Prods. Co. v. Wils, 509 N.E.2d 850, 855-56 (End. App. 1987);
Crosby v. Cox Aircraft Co., 746 P.2d 1198, 1201 (Wash. 1987) (en banc); Sprankle v.
Bower Ammonia & Chem. Co., 824 F.2d 409, 415-16 (5th Cir. 1987) (applying
Mississippi law); Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. v. American Cyanamid Corp., 916 F.2d
1174, 1177-79 (7th Cir. 1990); Matomco Oil Co. v. Arctic Mechanical Inc., 796 P.2d
1336, 1341 (Alaska 1990); Fortier v. Flambeau Plastics Co., 476 N.W.2d 593, 607-08
(Wis. Ct. App. 1991); Edwards v. Post Transp. Co., 279 Cal. Rptr. 231 (1991); Arlington
Forest Assoc. v. Exxon Corp., 774 F. Supp. 387, 390 (E.D. Va. 1991); Green v. Ensign-
Bickford Co., 595 A.2d 1383, 1387 (Conn. App. 1991); Klein v. Pyrodyne Corp., 810
P.2d 917, 920 (Wash. 1991) (en bane); T&E Indus., Inc. v. Safety Light Corp., 587 A.2d
1249 (N.J. 1991); Arawana Mills Co. v. United Tech. Corp., 795 F. Supp. 1238, 1250-52
(D. Conn. 1992); Richmond, Fredericksburg & Putman Ry. v. Davis Indus., Inc. 787 F.
Supp. 572, 575-76 (E.D. Va. 1992); In re Tutu Wells Contamination Litig., 846 F. Supp.
1243, 1269 (D.V.I. 1993); Schwartzman, Inc. v. General Elec. Co., 848 F. Supp. 942,
945 (D.N.M. 1993); Buggsi, Inc. v. Chevron, USA, 857 F. Supp. 1427, 1432 (D. Or.
1994); Rosenblatt v. Exxon Corp., 642 A.2d. 180, 185-88 (Md. 1994); Triffler v. Hopf,
No. 92 C 7193, 1994 WL 643237, at *9 (N.D. III. Nov. 4, 1994); Hagen v. Texaco Ref.
& Mktg., Inc., 526 N.W.2d 531, 539 (Iowa 1995); Smith v. Weaver, 665 A.2d 1215,
1219-20 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995); Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co., 902 P.2d 1229, 1233
(Utah 1995); Miller v. Civil Constructors, Inc., 651 N.E.2d 239, 244-45 (Il1. App. Ct.
1995); Koger v. Ferrin, 926 P.2d 680 (Kan. App. Ct. 1996) (by implication); Splendorio
v. Bilray Demolition Co., 682 A.2d 461, 465-66 (R.I. 1996); Foster v. City of Keyser,
501 S.E.2d 165, 174-75 (W. Va. 1997); Albahary v. City & Town of Bristol, 963 F.
Supp. 150, 155 (D. Conn. 1997); Grube v. Daun, 570 N.W.2d 851, 857 (Wis. 1997);
Thompson v. Mindis Metals, Inc., 692 So. 2d 805, 807 (Ala. 1997); Cadena v. Chicago
Fireworks Mfg. Co., 697 N.E.2d 802, 815 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998); Diffenderfer v. Staner,
722 A.2d 1103, 1107-08 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998); Price v. Keeney, No. CV 94 0542469,
1998 WL 417591, at *8-9 (D. Conn. July 10, 1998); Taylor v. Hesser, No. 91140, 1998
WL 764811, at *4 (Okla. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 1998); National Tel. Coop. Assoc. v. Exxon
Corp., No. Civ.A. 96-02504 (CKK), 1998 WL 966144, at *6 (D.D.C. Nov. 19, 1998);
Thompson v. Jump River Elec. Coop., 593 N.W.2d 901 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999).
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explosion of spilled gasoline from a truck, the court concluded that the
evidence supported a finding of strict liability in large part because
reasonable care could not have eliminated the risk of the activity. In
Langan v. Valicopters, Inc.19 the court cited law review commentators to
support its determindtion with respect to clause (c). The court wrote,
It is undisputed among the authorities cited to us that crop dusting involves
an element of risk of harm. In Note, Crop Dusting: Legal Problems in a New
Industry, the author points out that the drift of chemicals is virtually
unpredictable due to three "uncertain and uncontrollable factors: (1) the size of
the dust or spray particles; (2) the air disturbances created by the [applicating
aircraft]; and (3) natural atmospheric forces." The author discusses these three
factors in detail and notes: "In the opinion of leading scientists who are working
to alleviate the dangers of crop dusting, it is impossible to eliminate drift with
present knowledge and equipment. Experience bears this out." The author
states further that the problem of drift is reduced but not eliminated by the use
of helicopters. Subsequent commentators have made the same observations
about the uncontrollability of drift. In this case, thei 0is no evidence that it is
possible to eliminate the risk of drift in crop spraying.
While the court discussed the other factors set forth in section 520, it is
evident that the core rationale for imposing strict liability was the court's
finding that "it is impossible to eliminate drift with present knowledge
and equipment." What is important for our purposes was the central
position occupied by the "uncontrollability" of the risk and the absence
of any evidence that reasonable care could have prevented the
destruction of plaintiff's organic crops.
In Siegler v. Kuhlman'8' the same court held that strict liability was
applicable to render the owner of a gasoline trailer liable for the
wrongful death of a motorist. The victim died in flames from a gasoline
explosion when her automobile encountered a pool of spilled gasoline
on the highway from the defendant's gasoline trailer, which had broken
away from the truck towing it and had rolled down a hill onto the
highway. The opinion emphasized two points. First, the fact that the
explosion itself had literally destroyed all of the evidence necessary to
prove negligence by the truck owner argued in favor of strict liability.
After all, the court reasoned, one rationale for applying the doctrine is
the problem of proof that often accompanies blasting, falling aircraft,
179. 567 P.2d 218 (Wash. 1977) (en banc).
180. Id. at 222 (citations omitted) (emphasis added) (citing Comment, Crop
Dusting: Two Theories of Liability?, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 476, 477-79 (1968); Note, Crop
Dusting: Legal Problems in a New Industry, 6 STAN. L. REv. 69, 72-75 (1953)).
181. 502P.2d 1181 (Wash. 1973) (enbanc).
and explosions, as in this case-which problem ought not fall on the
innocent plaintiff, but rather should fall on the one engaging in the
activity.' Second, the court seemed to take judicial notice of the
potential for catastrophe inherent in carrying 5000 gallons of gasoline by
truck over a crowded highway. The court wrote,
Nor will the exercise of due and reasonable care assure protection to the public
from the disastrous consequences of concealed or latent mechanical or
metallurgical defects in the carrier's equipment, from the negligence of third
parties, from latent defects in the highways and streets, and from all of the other
hazards not generally disclosed or guarded against by reasonable care, prudence
and foresight. Hauling gasoline in great quantities as freight, wR3think, is an
activity that calls for the application of principles of strict liability.
In any case, it is evident that the Siegler court clearly regarded clause (c)
of section 520 as critical to the analysis.' 4 One might quarrel with the
validity of the court's finding that reasonable care could not protect
against the risks of carrying gasoline, but it is beyond dispute that such a
finding was central to the court's reasoning in finding strict liability
applicable.
There are a handful of recent decisions, unmistakably a minority, that
eschew any reliance on section 520(c). A decision that exemplifies this
approach is T&E Industries, Inc. v. Safety Light Corp."85 Here, the New
Jersey Supreme Court held that the disposal of radium tailings in the
early twentieth century on property later purchased by the plaintiff was
an abnormally dangerous activity. The court focused not on the
Restatement factors but on the issue of foreseeability and knowledge-
that is, on whether an actor can be strictly liable even though at the time
of the activity the dangers it posed to others were not known.
Ultimately, the Court inferred constructive knowledge of the dangers by
the defendant. In its only possible reliance on clause (c), the court
simply stated that "one cannot safely dis pose of radium by dumping it
onto the vacant portions of an urban lot."' 6
182. See id. at 1185 (quoting Cornelius J. Peck, Negligence and Liability Without
Fault in Tort Law, 46 WASH. L. REv. 225, 240 (1971)).
183. Id. at 1187.
184. See also Klein v. Pyrodyne Corp., 810 P.2d 917 (Wash. 1991) (en banc), in
which the court held that setting off public fireworks displays is an abnormally
dangerous activity justifying imposition of strict liability; the activity entails existence of
a high degree of risk of some harm to person, land, or chattels of others; the likelihood
that harm that results from it will be great; there is an inability to eliminate the risk by
the exercise of reasonable care, and the activity is not of common usage. See id. at 920.
It stated, "Furthermore, no matter how much care pyrotechnicians exercise, they cannot
entirely eliminate the high risk inherent in setting off powerful explosives such as
fireworks near crowds." Id.
185. 587 A.2d 1249 (N.J. 1991).
186. Id. at 1261.
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Notwithstanding the minority approach, the weight of authority holds
that, in order to establish the abnormally dangerous nature of an activity,
the plaintiff must show that due care by the defendant would not have
prevented the harm suffered by the plaintiff. Stated differently, the
Court must find that the demonstration of negligence as a proximate
cause of the harm is not possible. Effectively, the plaintiff carries a
burden of proving that it cannot prove negligence.
C. Additional Reasons for the Insurmountability of Section 520(c)
Closely related to the daunting challenge of section 520(c) to any
plaintiff asserting a SLADA claim are several other considerations
which have accentuated the plaintiffs difficulty. These are now
discussed in turn.
1. Due Care Need Only Eliminate the High Risk, Not All Risk
Carefully parsed, the language of section 520 can be interpreted to
mean that it is only the high risk, the extra or abnormal level of risk, that
needs to be alleviated by due care before strict liability becomes
inapplicable. Thus, it does not have to be true that all of the risk can be
removed by due care to disqualify the strict liability claim; once the
abnormal level of risk is deemed preventable, the SLADA doctrine
becomes inapplicable because the plaintiff cannot satisfy the
requirements of section 520(c). The argument is that "the risk" referred
to in section 520(c) that cannot be eliminated is the "existence of a high
degree of risk" set forth in clause (a). In other words, the antecedent of
"the risk" in (c) is the "high degree of risk" in (a). Further, the phrase,
"it will be great" in section 520(b) is interpreted as also referring back to
the "high degree of risk of some harm" in section 520(a). The comments
to section 520, quoted earlier in Part II, seem to support this construction
of the black letter rule.87 Indeed, Prosser refers in comment "h" to the
"residual risk after the exercise of care," implying that if due care
removes that residual risk, no strict liability attaches.'83 Regardless of
the merits of this interpretation, the opinions have so construed section
520(c).
Consider the Washington Supreme Court case of New Meadows
187. See RESTATEmENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 520 cnt. h (1977).
188. Id.
Holding Co. v. Washington Water Power Co.'89 This case involved an
action against a natural gas utility company to recover damages arising
out of a fire allegedly caused by a gas line that was damaged by a
telephone cable. After first concluding that factors (a) and (b) were
satisfied given the explosive nature of natural gas, the court turned to a
consideration of clause (c), writing,
A[s] to factor (c), the phrase "the risk" plainly refers to the "high degree of risk"
mentioned in factor (a). Thus, factor (c) addresses itself to the question of
whether, through the exercise of ordinary care, the risk inherent in an activity
can be reduced to the point where it can no longer be characterized as a "high
degree of risk[.J"[ ]
Some degree of risk of natural gas pipeline leaks will always be present.
This does not mean, however, that the "high degree of risk" with which section
520 is concerned cannot be eliminated by the use of reasonable care with regard
to the dangerous character of the commodity. Gas companies are subject to
strict federal and state safety regulations. Programs for corrosion control,
pipeline testing, gas leak investigation, and awareness of construction work near
gas company facilities must be maintained. Odorizers are placed in the gas
itself to increase the likelihood of detection in those rare instances when natural
gas does escape. In light of all this, we believe the high degree of risk involved
in the transmission of natural gas through undergroundjgnes can be eliminated
by the use of reasonable care and legislative safeguards.
Thus, New Meadows unequivocally supports that construction of section
520(c) which requires only that the high degree of risk be preventable by
due care. New Meadows, moreover, does not stand alone. For example,
a Wisconsin appeals court, in a case involving high voltage transmission
lines, ruled that "the risk of injury need not be eliminated, just
minimized."''
Likewise, a federal district court, applying Virginia law to a leaking
underground storage tank case, held that the test of section 520(c) "does
not contemplate that all risk be capable of elimination by due care,"
since "[a]bsolute safety is not required."'9 2 The court observed that the
language of section 520(c) was "ambiguous," but preferred a "straight
forward reading" that treated the reference to "the risk" in clause (c) to
be the "high degree of risk" in clause (a).'93 After pointing out that
negligence law provides a sufficient deterrent against leaking tanks, the
court concluded:
189. 687 P.2d 212 (Wash. 1984) (en bane).
190. Id. at 216 (citations omitted).
191. Estate of Thompson v. Jump River Elec. Coop., 593 N.W.2d 901, 905 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1999). The Court stated that "[t]he test ... is whether the risk of injury can be
minimized." Id. at 906 (citing Wagner v. Continental Cas. Co., 421 N.W.2d 835, 840
(Wis. 1988)).
192. Arlington Forest Assoc. v. Exxon Corp., 774 F. Supp. 387, 390 (E.D. Va.
1991).
193. Id. at 390 n.4.
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Maintained, monitored, and used with due care, underground gasoline
storage tanks present virtually no risk of injury from seepage of their contents.
They are not abnormally dangerous. Sound tanks, timely replacement of
impaired tanks, modem corrosion control techniques, and adequate testing for
leakage can eliminate all but a tolerably small amount of risk. The injury
alleged in this case apparently occurred because the tanks fell into a preventable
state of disrepair. Only those activities that remain dangerous despite the
exercise of all reasonable precautions warrant imposition of stric;9tiability.
Here, reasonable precautions would have sufficed to prevent the harm.
No decisions have explicitly rejected the foregoing proposition, at
least not as a matter of interpretation.'95 In any event, it is clear that, by
only requiring the minimization of risk to acceptable levels, the modem
courts have resisted the imposition of strict liability where it otherwise
might apply.
2. Applicable Government Regulations Support a Finding that the Risk
Can Be Minimized with Due Care
In many recent cases the activity under consideration has been the
subject of government regulations that prescribe how the activity is to be
safely undertaken. Roughly a half dozen decisions have stated or
implied that such regulations strongly support the inference that due care
can produce reasonable safety, so that the activity is not abnormally
dangerous. Thus, a federal district court, in analyzing the disposal of
hazardous substances at a Superfund site, concluded that "[a]lthough
hazardous material and petroleum products may present a substantial
degree of risk when mishandled... [these] risks can be eliminated
through the exercise of reasonable care."'96 As its rationale it offered
this: "Indeed, the premise of many environmental laws... is that proper
handling and disposal of these materials minimizes or eliminates the risk
of their use."' 97 In the Arlington Forest case cited earlier (involving
leaking underground storage tanks), the court made the rather obvious
observation that "[a]dvances in technology and safety standards continue
to enhance safety."'93
194. Id. at 390-91 (footnote omitted).
195. But see Klein v. Pyrodyne Corp., 810 P.2d 917 (Wash. 1991) (en banc) (stating
that the entire risk must be eliminated in context of fireworks display).
196. Schwartzman, Inc. v. General Elec. Co., 848 F. Supp 942, 945 (D.N.M. 1993).
197. Id. at 945 (referring to the RCRA, Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
2601 et seq. (1994 & Supp. 111 1997), and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136 et seq. (1994 & Supp. 1111997)).
198. Arlington Forest Assoc. v. Exxon Corp., 774 F. Supp. 387, 390 n.5 (E.D. Va.
A Connecticut superior court in Sanchez v. General Urban Corp.'99
refused to apply strict liability in connection with premises containing
lead-based paint largely because of the extensive regulations governing
the abatement of dangers posed by such painted surfaces. Although the
plaintiffs argued that the regulatory scheme demonstrated the
unavoidable risk of harm to minor children, the court rejected that
position, writing,
The "regulations... demonstrate that the dangers associated with lead-based
paint can be avoided, so long as landlords comply with the statutory and
regulatory schemes governing lead-based paint." Thus, since the landlord, in
the exercise of reasonable care, is able to eliminate the risk of lead-based paint
through inspection and abatement of defegive surfaces, the doctrine of
abnormally dangerous activity is inapplicable.
As to the display of fireworks and the effect to be given to government
regulation of that activity, an Illinois appellate court also rejected the
position that regulation implies ultrahazardousness. The court wrote,
Plaintiffs' argument that the Illinois legislature has regulated the use of
fireworks, however, supports the opposite conclusion. While plaintiffs are
correct in stating that under the Fireworks Regulation Act, and the Fireworks
Use Act, the Illinois legislature has regulated the use of fireworks, the
legislature did not, when passing these acts, determine that the displaying of
fireworks should be considered itrahazardous, and we also, as discussed above,
do not find them ultrahazardous.
Note that this court expressly declined to follow Klein v. Pyrodyne
Corp.,°202 which held that fireworks displays are an abnormally dangerous
activity. In Klein, the Washington Supreme Court viewed the elaborate
scheme of regulation as proof of the dangerousness of fireworks
displays."°3 It wrote,
Pyrodyne argues that if the regulations are complied with, then the high
degree of risk otherwise inherent in the displays can be eliminated. Although
we recognize that the high risk can be reduced, we do not agree that it can be
eliminated. Setting off powerful fireworks near large crowds remains a highly
risky activity even when the safety precautions mandated by statutes and
regulations are followed. The Legislature appears to agree, for it has declared
that in order to obtain a license to conduct a public fireworks display, a
pyrotechnician must first obtain a surety bond or a cerificat of insurance, the
amount of which must be at least $1,000,000 for each event.
1991).
199. No. LPLCV 950378774S, 1997 WL 78176 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 6,1997).
200. Id. at *8 (citation omitted).
201. Cadena v. Chicago Fireworks Mfg. Co., 697 N.E.2d 802, 814-15 (Ill. App. Ct.
1998) (citations omitted).
202. 810P.2d917 (Wash. 1991) (enbanc).
203. See id. at 920.
204. Id. at 921. In a footnote, it observed that, "The fact that the Legislature has
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Interestingly, in the New Meadows decision quoted earlier, the same
court which decided Klein relied on the extensive regulation of natural
gas pipelines as a reason for not finding strict liability, reasoning that
"the high degree of risk involved in the transmission of natural gas...
can be eliminated by the use of reasonable care and legislative
safeguards." 5
Therefore, of the decisions that have expressly considered the issue,
the clear majority concludes that applicable governmental safety
regulations cut against the imposition of strict liability because arguably
compliance with such regulation substantially eliminates the dangers of
the activity. The idea is that, the more the activity is subjected to
regulatory dictates, the more compelling the inference that due care and
regulatory compliance will reduce the risks of the activity to acceptable
levels. Moreover, this argument seems especially well suited to the
field of environmental contamination where current laws are designed to
substantially abate the dangers of air emissions,' water emissions,08 and
the treatment and disposal of hazardous wastes2
There are, however, contrary decisions finding that a regulatory
regime increases the prospects for an activity to be abnormally
dangerous. Examples include the New Jersey Supreme Court case of
State Department of Environmental Protection v. Ventron Corp.10 and
the Utah Supreme Court case of Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc. 211 In
Ventron, the Court suggested that the state's policy, evident in a strict
liability statute called the Spill Compensation and Control Act, bolstered
the arguments for strict liability in connection with the disposal of
mercury.2 2  And in Branch, Utah's laws protecting surface and
mandated a $1,000,000 liability policy for pyrotechnicians, however, does suggest that
the Legislature views public fireworks displays as involving a high risk even when the
appropriate safety precautions are taken." Id. at 921 n.3.
205. New Meadows Holding Co., v. Washington Water Power Co., 687 P.2d 212,
216 (Wash. 1984) (en bane).
206. After all, noncompliance with the standards will often constitute negligence
per se. See infra Part II.C.3.
207. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994 & Supp. 1111997).
208. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994 &
Supp. 11I 1997).
209. See Resource Conservation & Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1994 &
Supp. III 1997); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980,42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994 & Supp. 1 1997).
210. 468 A.2d 150 (N.J. 1983).
211. 657P.2d267 (Utah 1982).
212. See Ventron, 468 A.2d at 160.
subterranean waters from oil pollution were cited to support a finding of
abnormally dangerous activity.213 But these decisions do not alter the
basic point that many courts--certainly a majority that have expressly
addressed the matter-rely on a regulatory program as a further
justification for disallowing claims of strict liability under sections 519
and 520 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
3. Noncompliance with Governmental Regulations May Support a
Negligence Per Se Claim
Government regulations also have another impact on the erosion of
strict liability in the SLADA context. In cases where the defendant has
violated a government safety standard, that violation may support a
negligence per se claim, which in turn obviates the need for any
application of SLADA principles. Illustrative of this phenomenon is
Bagley v. Controlled Environmental Corp. ,21 in which, as quoted earlier,
the court rejected strict liability because there was no showing of the
impossibility of proving negligence. However, Justice Souter found that
the plaintiff's case was saved by virtue of the defendant's violation of
New Hampshire's waste disposal laws. Indeed, he used the statutory
violation as ajustification for not applying strict liability. He explained,
While we therefore affirm the dismissal of the count in strict liability, it
does not follow that the dangers of hazardous waste will have no particular
recognition in the law of the State, because we do hold that the plaintiff has
stated a cause of action predicated on a statutory violation. "It is well
established law in this State that a causal violation of a statutory standard of
conduct constitutes legal fault in the same manner as does the causal violation
of a common-law standard of due care, that is, causal negligence. In both
instances liability is imposed because of the eitence of legal fault, that is, a
departure from a required standard of conduct.'
In other words, section 519 and section 520 must be read to incorporate
any basis for a negligence action, including those predicated on
negligence per se. This makes sense: only if plaintiff can prove no form
of negligence is reliance on strict liability warranted. After all, who
needs SLADA and its complex set of factors if a claimant can sustain a
cause of action resembling "true" strict liability by establishing
negligence per se?
The Connecticut Supreme Court employed similar reasoning in an
action brought by minor children against a landlord for alleged
213. See Branch, 657 P.2d at 273.
214. 503 A.2d 823 (N.H. 1986).
215. Id. at 826 (quoting Moulton v. Groveton Paper Co., 289 A.2d 68, 71 (N.H.
1972)).
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poisoning from lead-based paints. Here a statute provided that the
presence of paint containing lead in excess of federally prescribed
standards (or the presence of certain flaking or peeling paint constituting
a "health hazard") renders a premises uninhabitable and imposes a duty
on the landlord to correct the deficiency. 7 Finding that the landlord's
non-compliance constituted negligence per se, the court simply avoided
the consideration of SLADA liability under either the common law or
applicable statutes. 8
4. The Flexibility of Negligence Allows a Higher Degree of Care for
Dangerous Activities
Another consideration that serves to undermine the availability of
SLADA is the inherent flexibility of the negligence concept. Negligence
principles do not require the same amount of care under all
circumstances; the amount of care that must be exercised to avoid being
negligent is commensurate with the riskiness of the activity. Therefore,
for activities that are likely to be dangerous, those that are candidates for
strict liability, the standard of care (which never changes) is flexible
enough to require defendant to take additional precautions just because
of the dangers posed.
A few decisions have used precisely this rationale for rejecting the
application of strict liability. For example, the Minnesota Supreme
Court, in a case involving damage from a leak in a natural gas pipeline,
refused to apply strict liability in part because of its view that the law of
negligence was adequate for regulating such an activity. 29 The Court
explained,
All jurisdictions, with minor variation, impose a high standard of care on the
gas distributor-care commensurate with the risk involved. In the case of
escaping natural gas, the risk is great because it is invisible, highly danggous to
person and property and, when it has leached through the soil, odorless.
Likewise, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals adopted similar
reasoning, also in a natural gas transmission case, stating that "a party
engaged in such activities or employing a dangerous instrumentality was
216. See Gore v. People's Say. Bank, 665 A.2d 1341 (Conn. 1995).
217. See id. at 1351.
218. See id.
219. See Mahowald v. Minnesota Gas Co., 344 N.W.2d 856 (Minn. 1984).
220. Id. at 861 (emphasis added).
held to 'the highest degree of care, a standard commensurate with the
dangerousness to be avoided."''
Moreover, this approach is not limited to cases involving public
utilities. An Illinois appellate court in an action brought against target
shooters by an injured bystander refused to apply SLADA.22 Instead,
the court marshaled an impressive array of authority for the proposition
that the standard of care imposes an obligation on the users of firearms
to exercise special precautions commensurate to the risks inherent in the
activity and, therefore, a rule of strict liability was unnecessary.2' In
discussing clause (c) of section 520, it held that the risks from firearms,
even though great, "can be virtually eliminated by the exercise of
reasonable or even 'utmost' care under the circumstances.'4 It
concluded,
The doctrine of strict or absolute liability is ordinarily reserved for abnormally
dangerous activities for which no degree of care can truly provide safety. There
is a clear distinction between requiring a defendant to exercise a high degree of
care when involved in a potentially dangerous activity and requiring a defendant
to insurs absolutely the safety of others when engaging in ultrahazardous
activity.
Several cases have applied precisely this reasoning in concluding that
the use of chlorine gas as a purifier in the town's water supply,2 and as
part of the manufacturing process for making liquid bleach, did not
221. Foster v. City of Keyser, 501 S.E.2d 165, 174 (W. Va. 1997) (quoting Peneschi
v. National Steel Corp., 295 S.E.2d 1, 7 (W. Va. 1982)).
222. See Miller v. Civil Constructors, Inc., 651 N.E.2d 239, 241 (MI. App. Ct.
1995).
223. See id. The Court explained,
This standard or degree of care is evidently a flexible one which varies
according to the particular circumstances. Imposing a duty of ordinary care,
even where it may become a high degree of care under the particular
circumstances, is quite different from imposing strict or absolute liability by
classifying the activity ultrahazardous. Our review of the authorities thus
discloses that the discharge of firearms resulting in injury ordinarily presents a
question of negligence and that the standard of care is ordinary care-one
which may be equated to a high degree of care because of the particular
circumstances presented.
Id. at 244.
224. Id. at 245 (citation omitted).
225. Id. See also Jacoves v. United Merchandising Corp., 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468 (Ct.
App. 1992) (holding no ultrahazardous activity warranting imposition of absolute
liability, but highest standard of due care applied); Reida v. Lund, 96 Cal. Rptr. 102 (Ct.
App. 1971) (stating that leaving a rifle accessible was issue of negligence; use of
firearms not ultrahazardous activity resulting in imposition of absolute liability); Mikula
v. Duliba, 464 N.Y.S.2d 910, 913 (1983) (holding that although firearms are dangerous
instrumentalities, their use while hunting is not abnormally dangerous activity requiring
imposition of strict liability).
226. See Kajiya v. Department of Water Supply, 629 P.2d 635, 639 (Haw. Ct. App.
1981).
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constitute an abnormally dangerous activity. 7
The Restatement (Second) itself also contemplates this sliding scale of
care to reflect the dangerousnesss of the activity. Comment "h" to 520,
quoted earlier in its entirety, states, "What is referred to here is the
unavoidable risk remaining in the activity, even though the actor has
taken all reasonable precautions in advance and has exercised all
reasonable care in his operation, so that he is not negligent." Thus,
language requiring the exercise of "all reasonable care" and the
provision of "all reasonable precautions" may impose obligation of
varying magnitude under negligence law. This fact, in turn, can
preclude the application of strict liability if the risk involved is one
which can be minimized to acceptable levels through the exercise of a
relatively high level of care. Indeed, section 519 refers to the "utmost
care"--providing that liability can attach for harm caused by an activity
"although [defendant] has exercised the utmost care to prevent the
harm."229 Prosser's use of this language might be interpreted to mean
that a defendant's obligation under a negligence standard will be pushed
to the edges of the available technology and precaution. Such an
implication might then lead to the conclusion that, before strict liability
is triggered, the defendant must have exercised this highest degree of
care. Unquestionably such a threshold would serve to drastically reduce
the occasions in which a plaintiff could bring a strict liability claim
under the law of the Restatement.
5. The Availability of Res Ipsa Loquitur Also Obviates the Need for
Strict Liability
Yet another well-established principle of negligence law that stands as
a barrier to the application of strict liability is the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur. Illustrative is the reasoning of the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals in the context of a national gas explosion, where the
Court refused to permit a strict liability claim, writing,
We believe that the combination of the high standard of care which must be
observed in the transmission of natural gas ... coupled with the availability of
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in appropriate cases to a party seeking to prove
negligence in the conduct of such transmission.., should ordinarily make it
unnecessary to apply the doctrine of strict liability in cases involving explosions
227. See Erbrich Prods., Inc. v. Wills, 509 N.E.2d 850, 854-55 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).
228. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oFTORTS § 520 cmt. h (1977) (emphasis added).
229. Id. § 519(1) (emphasis added).
caused by leaking natural gas transmission lines72 °
The court engaged in an extensive discussion of why res ipsa was
applicable, frequently noting the close relationship between Rylands and
res ipsa.2" According to the court, if the injury-causing event is one
which does not usually occur in the absence of negligence, then res ipsa
provides the basis of liability and the plaintiff may not recover on a strict
liability claim. 2 Thus, according to such reasoning, just as sections 519
and 520 disallow a strict liability claim when a negligence per se claim
can be made, so also these sections disallow a strict liability claim when
a res ipsa claim can be made.23'
Consider next the Washington Supreme Court case of Siegler v.
Kuhlman.24 Here the court imposed strict liability for an explosion
caused from gas spillage from a tanker truck, also on the theory of res
ipsa loquitur 5 The court held that it was error for the trial court to
refuse to give a res ipsa instruction to the jury. ' 6 While the court did not
rely on res ipsa to bar the availability of strict liability, the opinion does
illustrate the close affinity between the two doctrines. Moreover, in
Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad v. American Cyanamid Co.,' Judge
Posner seemed to imply that the real basis of liability in Siegler was res
ipsa because the explosion had destroyed direct evidence of
230. Foster v. City of Keyser, 501 S.E.2d 165, 175 (W. Va. 1997).
231. See id. at 178. The court cited the following words as authority:
[I]n res ipsa cases as well as in Rylands negligence need not be proven. When
we speak in res ipsa terms, we are speaking of negligence: because of the res
ipsa rule of circumstantial evidence, negligence is presumed until the
defendant rebuts the presumption. On the other hand, in Rylands-type cases,
the basis of the liability is not negligence, but rather the defendant's intentional
behavior in exposing others to a risk.
Id. (quoting Peneschi v. National Steel Corp., 295 S.E.2d 1, 7 (W. Va. 1982)).
232. See id. at 185.
233. See also Mahowald v. Minnesota Gas Co., 344 N.W.2d 856 (Minn. 1984).
The court refused to apply strict liability to a natural gas explosion but instead ordered
retrial on a res ipsa theory, stating,
In the ordinary course of events, natural gas does not escape from gas
mains in public streets so as to cause explosion. When it does so escape and
does result in an explosion, an inference of fault on the part of the gas
distribution company is justifiable. Even though the gas company may be
faultless, in view of its superior knowledge of the gas distribution system, its
access and opportunity to identify persons acting in the vicinity of the gas
mains, its inspection and control over the mains, and its responsibility for the
safety of the persons and property in the community, the gas company should
have the obligation to show it was not negligent or to establish who was.
Id. at 863.
234. 502 P.2d 1181 (Wash. 1972) (en banc).
235. See id. at 1184.
236. See id.
237. 916 F.2d 1174 (7th Cir. 1990).
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negligence. 8 By invoking res ipsa, the plaintiff clearly derives some of
the same benefits which are afforded by strict liability. The plaintiff is
permitted to use circumstantial evidence to establish a prima facie case;
in these cases, the theory that events do not ordinarily happen in the way
they did absent negligence substitutes for direct evidence. If the
instrumentality causing the injury was in the control of the defendant
(which is typically true in dangerous activity cases), the plaintiff gets to
the jury without proof of specific acts of negligence. This, in essence,
reverses the burden of production, and comes very close to being the
equivalent of strict liability.2"
6. Defining the "Activity" Broadly Defeats Strict Liability
Strict liability applies to abnormally dangerous "activities."
Therefore, how the "activity" being evaluated is described by the court
will greatly influence the outcome of the analysis under section 520. By
defining the activity at the greatest level of generality, the probability of
finding strict liability is reduced. Consider, for example, the case of
Indiana Harbor Belt, where Judge Posner asserted that the activity of
shipping is the relevant activity, writing,
In emphasizing the flammability and toxicity of acrylonitrile rather than the
hazards of transporting it, as in failing to distinguish between the active and the
passive shipper, the plaintiff overlooks the fact that ultrahazardousness or
abnormal dangerousnsess is, in the contemplation of the law at least, a property
not of substances, but of activities: not of acry1.~itrile, but of the transportation
of acrylonitrile by rail through populated areas.
Moreover, Posner made much of the fact that the substance in this case
is ranked fifty-third among the most 125 hazardous materials shipped in
high volume on the nation's railroads.241 Further, he stressed that, if
strict liability were to apply in this case, then "[e]very shipper of any of
these materials would therefore be strictly liable for the consequences of
a spill or other accident that occurred while the material was being
shipped through a metropolitan area.' '2 2 Framed in this manner, the
ultimate holding of the case seems inevitable: No court could stake out
238. See id. at 1179.
239. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring).
240. Indiana Harbor Belt, 916 F.2d at 1181.
241. See id. at 1178.
242. Id.
such a broad proposition of strict liability.
A couple of Pennsylvania decisions also make the point that defining
the activity is crucial to the disposition. In Smith v. WeaverU3 the court
rejected the plaintiff's argument that a leaking underground storage tank
was abnormally dangerous.24 The court recognized the crucial
importance of how the activity would be defined, writing,
The buyers would urge us to consider not whether underground tanks are
abnormally dangerous, but rather whether underground storage tanks which are
leaking a hazardous substance, are abnormally dangerous. By so phrasing the
issue the buyers are seeking to have us view the results of the activity, instead of
the activity itself. Although a dangerous condition may have later developed, or
harm may have occurred, the proper focus is on the activM itself, the storage of
potentially hazardous substances in an underground tank.
This analysis is performed antecedent to applying the factors of section
520, but it dictates the outcome. The court easily finds that gasoline and
other petroleum products can be stored and dispensed safely with
reasonable care.2  In another case the court considered whether the
storage of Thimet, a highly toxic pesticide, in a barn (which storage
activity ultimately caused the contamination of cow feed and the death
of several dairy cows) was an abnormally dangerous activity.247  The
court reversed the trial court, finding a jury instruction to be in error
because it "focused the strict liability claim on the leaking of the
pesticide, not on its storage." 4 The court, looking to the Restatement
factors, pointed out that storing pesticides in a barn does not pose a high
degree of risk to others, and, based on expert testimony at the trial,
concluded that "the risk of storing Thimet can be eliminated with the
exercise of reasonable care. 249
The Rhode Island Supreme Court applied similar reasoning in holding
that an engineering firm that undertook an asbestos remediation project
as part of a building demolition that released asbestos fibers onto
plaintiffs property was not engaged in an abnormally dangerous
activity50 The court emphasized that strict liability applied only to
activities, not to dangerous materials."' The court explained, "[I]f the
rule were otherwise, virtually any commercial activity involving
substances which are dangerous in the abstract automatically would be
243. 665 A.2d 1215 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
244. See id. at 1219-20.
245. Id. at 1219 (emphasis added).
246. See id. at 1220.
247. See Diffenderfer v. Staner, 772 A.2d 1103 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998).
248. Id. at 1106.
249. Id. at 1108.
250. See Splendoria v. Bilray Demolition Co., 682 A.2d 461 (R.I. 1996).
251. See id. at 465-66.
[VOL. 36: 597, 1999] Strict Liability
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEV
deemed as abnormally dangerous. This result would be intolerable.,15
2
A federal district court in an underground storage tank case undertook
a considerable discussion of this issue- 3 In the Arlington Forest case
the court criticized a plaintiff for characterizing the relevant activity as
the leaking of moribund underground tanks, rather than assuming for the
purpose of defining the activity the "normal and nondefective condition
of underground tanks."'z  The court explained that plaintiff's
particularized approach was objectionable because it would "enable
plaintiffs to invoke strict liability for all negligently-conducted
activity. ''2"
Two New Jersey Supreme Court opinions are often cited as showing
the potential reach of the Restatement (Second) doctrine. Both couched
the description of the relevant activity in terms that allowed the
imposition of strict liability despite the language of section 520(c). In
State Department of Environmental Protection v. Ventron, 2 6 the court
overruled a century-old decision, and adopted the doctrine of Rylands.
Ventron involved a processing plant from which mercury-laden effluent
had escaped and reached a creek and a tidal estuary. The court adopted
a sweeping proposition that "a landowner is strictly liable to others for
harm caused by toxic wastes that are stored on his property and flow
onto the property of others.""n7 After tracing the history of the Rylands
252. Id. at 466 (quoting G.J. Leasing Co. v. Union Elec. Co., 854 F. Supp. 539, 568
(S.D. 11. 1994) (quoting City of Bloomington v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 891 F.2d
611, 615-17 (7th Cir. 1989)). Accord Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. v.
Davis Indus., Inc., 787 F. Supp. 572, 575 (E.D. Va. 1992) (finding that the manufacture,
storage and disposal of air conditioners containing PCBs was not an abnormally
dangerous or ultrahazardous activity).
253. See Arlington Forest Assoc. v. Exxon Corp., 774 F. Supp 387 (E.D. Va. 1991).
254. Id. at 392.
255. Id. The court continued,
Any plaintiff in a negligence action could simply characterize the offending
behavior as incapable of being safely performed even with due care, thus
bringing it within the scope of strict liability. For example, the activity of
"driving a car" can be made sufficiently safe by the exercise of reasonable
care. But "driving a car at an excessive rate of speed" cannot be made safe
except by ceasing to drive too fast. Clearly this approach would extend the
reaches of strict liability far beyond the bounds of the law and of common
sense. The Court does not doubt that the injury inflicted in this case stems
from the presence of moribund storage tanks; however, this fact properly
relates to the issue of negligence.
1d. at 392-93.
256. 468 A.2d 150 (N.J. 1983), overruling Marshall v. Wood, 38 N.J.L. 339 (N.J.
Sup. Ct. 1876).
257. Id. at 157.
rule in New Jersey, the court adopted the Restatement (Second)
formulation which it believed incorporated the standard of Rylands.28
As to clause (c), the entire analysis consisted of this statement: "With
respect to the ability to eliminate the risks involved in disposing of
hazardous wastes by the exercise of reasonable care, no safe way exists
to dispose of mercury by simply dumping it onto land or into water."'
By characterizing the activity and focusing on the end result-
"dumping it onto land or into water"--the court could easily find that
due care at that point in the sequence of events could not possibly
prevent harm from occurring. Thus, Ventron demonstrates the other end
of the definitional spectrum-using a particularized description of the
activity after the harm has occurred. Again, how the case comes out
depended upon the characterization of the activity.
The New Jersey Supreme Court used the same post hoc
characterization in T&E Industries v. Safety Light Corp., a case
involving disposal of radium tailings. The court never really purported
to undertake a factor-by-factor analysis under section 520; instead, it
simply wrote,
Furthermore, although the risks involved in the processing and disposal of
radium might be curtailed, one cannot safely dispose of radium by dumping it
onto the vacant portions of an urban lot. Because of the extraordinarily-
hazardous nature of radium, the processing and disposal of that substance is
particularly inappropriate in an urban setting. We conclude that despite the
usefulness of radium, defendant's processing, handling, and disposal of that
substane, under the facts of this case constituted an abnormally-dangerous
activity.
In spite of these New Jersey cases, it is evident that many courts
describe the "activity" in its benign, pre-injury-causing condition, and as
a consequence conclude that reasonable care could have prevented the
risk of harm. In both Ventron and T&E Industries, if the activity were
viewed as management of mercury or radium in the manufacturing
processes, then the court could find that the exercise of reasonable care
258. See id.
259. Id. at 160 (emphasis added).
260. 587 A.2d 1249 (N.L 1991).
261. Id. at 1261 (emphasis added). See also Albahary v. City & Town of Bristol,
963 F. Supp. 150, 155-56 (D. Conn. 1997). The Albahary court wrote,
Because hazardous materials are an instrumentality capable of producing
harm, and because the circumstances and conditions of its disposal into a
municipal landfill, irrespective of a lawful purpose or due care, involve a
substantial risk of probable injury to the person or property of others, the Court
concludes that disposal of hazardous and toxic wastes at a landfill may
constitute an abnormally dangerous or ultrahazardous activity sufficient to
maintain a cause of action for strict liability ....
Id. at 156.
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might have avoided the harm suffered by the plaintiffs. On the other
hand, the court is probably correct in its conclusion that, once radium or
mercury is dumped into the soil or groundwater, reasonable care can't
eliminate the high degree of risk. The real issue is which
characterization of the activity makes more sense.
Sections B and C of Part III are intended to demonstrate several
points. First, factor (c) of section 520 is not outweighed by other factors
which support application of strict liability. Rather, the overwhelming
majority of decisions regard proof of the inability to eliminate the risk as
indispensable. These courts reason that, if negligence law can provide
sufficient incentive to prevent the risk of harm, "who needs strict
liability?" Second, the real effect of section 520(c) is bolstered by a
variety of negligence doctrines such as negligence per se, res ipsa
loquitur, and care commensurate with risk, which in the aggregate serve
to reduce even further those situations where negligence law might be
inadequate. Finally, by describing the relevant "activity" with a degree
of generality and before the injury takes place, and by not addressing
"substances" themselves, the courts have clearly decreased the
probability that a plaintiff will prevail on the issue of section 520(c).
7. The Immunity Conundrum Demands Reliance on Section 520(c)
A last consideration explains why the controlling inquiry in nearly all
cases is whether the risks of the activity can be prevented by the exercise
of reasonable care. Let us assume that a plaintiff maintains that an
activity, call it activity x, is subject to strict liability under sections 519
and 520. What options are available to the court regarding the
applicable liability rule? The first option, and the one most often
exercised, is to hold that the negligence system can function to eliminate
or reduce the risks of the activity to acceptable levels. In most cases, as
is shown above in Parts U1.B and Ill.C, the court concludes that it is not
impossible for the plaintiff to proceed with a negligence theory. Even
though a negligence claim may not prevail on the merits, the courts point
to the nature of the activity itself and the resultant harm, holding that the
purpose of tort law is adequately served by the application of negligence
principles. But what happens if the court concludes that the negligence
system cannot operate to reduce the risks of this activity sufficiently? If
the court resolves section 520(c) favorably to the plaintiff, can the court
nevertheless reject a strict liability finding because of the impact of the
other factors under section 520? Stated differently, which party should
be made to bear the cost of the "unavoidable accident" in the context of
an abnormally dangerous activity? In my view, the only acceptable
answer in an enlightened and just society is that the party engaged in the
activity causing the harm must compensate its victim. To rule otherwise
would essentially confer tort immunity to a private actor or activity.
This would be a strange rule indeed. Apart from governmental
immunities or congressionally-conferred narrow immunities (as in the
operation of nuclear energy plants), modem courts do not invoke
judicially-created immunities for private enterprises causing harm,
regardless of the benefits to the community that undertaking the activity
might generate.
Nineteenth century and some earlier twentieth century courts were not
embarrassed by protecting an activity or enterprise from tort liability,262
but no self-respecting contemporary court would do so. What this
means is that the court, having ruled out negligence liability must not
also reject strict liability. This realization leads to an important
observation concerning the analysis of the other factors in section 520.
Having found that section 520(c) cuts in the plaintiff's favor, the court
should have little or no leeway in applying the other factors. Stated
more bluntly, once the court rejects recovery under the negligence
regime, the court should be obliged to render whatever post-hoe
rationalizations it deems advisable to support the imposition of strict
liability. I believe that the immunity conundrum in essence forces courts
in one of two directions. First, the court can apply any doctrines of the
law of negligence that might fit the case (whether or not raised by the
parties or the record in the case)-in which case strict liability does not
apply per the proviso of section 520(c). Alternatively, once recovery is
denied under a negligence regime, the court should find that strict
liability governs, making whatever findings are essential along the way
under sections 520(d), (e), and (f).
Is there any escape from the conundrum besides recognizing an
immunity? Yes. In some cases, the court might conclude that the law of
trespass or nuisance could rescue the plaintiff and avoid immunity for
defendant's activity. Therefore, the correct statement of my proposed
rule would be this: If a court finds that the risks of the activity are not
preventable or are not capable of substantial reduction by the exercise of
reasonable care, and if negligence cannot be shown in any form, and if
no other basis of liability can be found (e.g., trespass or nuisance), then
the court should simply find the activity to be abnormally dangerous.
Under such a rule, two results follow: First, the court will not reject all
262. Examples would include cases involving immunity for a charitable
organization.
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theories of liability (because it cannot). Second, the only factor under
section 520 that really matters is section 520(c).
D. The Risk of Harm: Clauses (a) and (b)
In this section I look briefly at how the courts have applied section
520(a) and (b). The comments to section 520 evidence an intent that the
sections interplay so that a small probability of great harm could yield
the finding of an abnormally dangerous activity (e.g., Three Mile Island)
or, alternatively, a higher probability of significant, but lesser, harm
could produce the same conclusion (e.g., fireworks display). There is no
question that many of the decisions actually finding SLADA involve
highly dangerous activities pursuant to the Restatement (Second)
formula (such as the use of explosives, the impounding of 500 million
gallons of phosphate, or the disposal of hazardous substances containing
mercury into a sensitive estuary). But not all of the decisions are so
obvious because they involve activities that to a lay person simply do
not conjure up a sense of excessive danger. For example, is crop dusting
really highly dangerous? The following discussion considers a small
sample of those cases which explicitly address factors (a) and (b) of
section 520.
First of all, one looks in vain for a decision that sustains SLADA that
doesn't treat factors (a) and (b) as essential, not merely "factors" or
"considerations." After all, the title "abnormally dangerous" clearly
connotes some level of risk not normal or usual. Clauses (a) and (b)
address that concern directly rather than obliquely as is done in Clause
(e) (concerning locational appropriateness). As is shown below,
although some courts have upheld a SLADA claim despite the absence
of clauses (d), (e), or (f), no court in my research ever did so in the face
of a negative determination pursuant to clauses (a) and (b). Moreover,
these considerations were not "factors" in the First Restatement-they
were required elements. So, courts were obviously accustomed to
regarding them as obligatory.
In the cases found, the discussions of the risks posed by the activity
are typically brief and are highly conclusory. Thus, "to explode
[fireworks] in the presence of large crowds of people, a high risk of
serious personal injury or property damage is created." '63 But is that
conclusion so obvious? The court offers no record evidence to support
263. Klein v. Pyrodyne Corp., 810 P.2d 917, 920 (Wash. 1991) (en bane).
that proposition, and another court, on similar facts, reached precisely
the opposite finding.64 On the other hand, in Klein, the Washington
Supreme Court cited an elaborate scheme of administrative regulations
applicable to pyrotechnicians as support for the finding of the
dangerousness of the activity.'
A Florida court held that the impoundment of billions of gallons of
phosphate slime behind earthen dams (in connection with a phosphate
mining operation) was abnormally dangerous.266 The court focused on
the magnitude of the danger and discounted all of the other factors,
writing,
In the final analysis, we are impressed by the magnitude of the activity and the
attendant risk of enon~nous damage. The impounding of billions of gallons of
phosphatic slimes behind earthen walls which are subject to breaking even with
the exercise of the best of care strikes us as being both "ultrahazardous" and
"abnormally dangerous," as the case may be.
This is not clear water which is being impounded. Here Cities Service
introduced water into its mining operation which when combined with
phosphatic wastes produced a phosphatic slime which had a high potential for
damage to the environment. If a break occurred, it was to be expected that
extensive damage would be visited upon property many miles away. In this
case, the damage, in fact, extended almost to the mouth of the Peace River,
which is far beyond the phosphate mining area described in the Cities Service
affidavit. We conclude that the Cities Service slime reservoir constitd a non-
natural use of the land such as to invoke the doctrine of strict liability.
In this decision it is the magnitude of the risk that compelled the court
to apply strict liability, this factor dwarfing all others. But the court also
relied on the fact that that risk could not be contained even with the best
of care, thereby adding as support for the decision factors (a), (b), and
(c). At that point, the other factors apparently became largely irrelevant.
Some courts attempt to sum up the whole theory of SLADA in a few
phrases that capture the essence of all six factors. For example, the
Oregon Supreme Court declared,
We have come to the conclusion that when an activity is extraordinary,
exceptional, or unusual, considering the locality in which it is carried on; when
there is a risk of grave harm from such abnormality; and when the risk cannot
be eliminated by the exerise of reasonable care, the activity should be classed
as abnormally dangerous.
Here the court concluded that operation of a service station was not
264. See Cadena v. Chicago Fireworks Mfg. Co., 697 N.E.2d 802, 814-15 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1998).
265. See Klein, 810 P.2d at 920-21.
266. See Cities Serv. Co. v. State, 312 So. 2d 799, 803 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
267. Id. at 803 (emphasis added).
268. Hudson v. Penny Oil Co., 566 P.2d 175, 177 (Or. 1977) (quoting McLane v.
Northwest Natural Gas, 467 P.2d 635, 637-38 (Or. 1970)).
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"extraordinary, exceptional, or unusual" and harm to be anticipated from
underground seepage was not "grave."269
A survey of cases analyzing factors (a) and (b) reveals little
consistency. The Fifth Circuit concluded that storage of anhydrous
ammonia was not abnormally dangerous because it is poisonous only in
large concentrations, so the likelihood that storage would lead to great
harm was "small," thereby not qualifying as an abnormally hazardous
activity under factors (a) and (b).270 By contrast, the Washington
Supreme Court in Langan v. Valicopters Inc.
27' and Siegler v. Kuhlman 72
evidenced greater awareness of the dangers inherent in crop dusting and
in the transporting of 5000 gallons of gasoline by truck, relying in both
cases on both record evidence and judicially noticed facts. Thus, in
Langan, the Court wrote,
Whether there will be great harm depends upon what adjoining property owners
do with their land. For example, one property owner may grow wheat (a
narrow-leafed crop) and his neighbor may grow peas (a broad-leaf crop). The
wheat farmer may wish to spray his crop with the chemical herbicide (weed
killer) 2,4-D, which kills only broad-leafed plants. If the 2,4-D drifts onto the
pea farmer's property, his entire crop could be destroyed since peas are broad-
leafed plants....
As the present case illustrates, it is economically damaging for an organic
farmer who is a member of NOFPA to apply non-organic materials to his crops
because he would lose the association's certification. There was substantial
evidence before the trial court that, once an organic farmer loses his
certification, it is highly unlikely that he will be able to sell his crops on the
regular commercial market due to his failure to enter into contracts with
commercial produce buyers before the season begins, and, even if he could sell
his crops to a commercial produce buyer, the farmer would be una)te to
command as high a price for his goods as he could on the organic market.
269. Id. at 178.
270. See Sprankle v. Bower Ammonia & Chem. Co., 824 F.2d 409,415-16 (5th Cir.
1987) (applying Mississippi law).
271. 567 P.2d 218 (Wash. 1977) (en bane).
272. 502 P.2d 1181 (Wash. 1973) (en banc).
273. Langan, 567 P.2d at 222 (citations omitted); see also Siegler, 502 P.2d at 1187.
The Siegler court painted a picture based largely on general community knowledge,
writing,
Contrast, however, the quiet, relatively safe, routine procedure of
installing and maintaining and using underground water mains ... with the
activity of carrying gasoline as freight in quantities of thousands of gallons at
freeway speeds... through cities and towns and on secondary roads in rural
districts. In comparing the quiescence and passive job of maintaining
underground water mains with the extremely heightened activity of carrying
nearly 5,000 gallons of gasoline by truck, one cannot escape the conclusion
that hauling gasoline as cargo is undeniably an abnormally dangerous activity
In its analysis here the court cited a chemistry treatise, a law review
article, judicial decisions, and record evidence-all to arrive at its
disposition with regard to factor (b).274 The Washington Supreme
Court's willingness to go beyond judicially noticed generalities is
extraordinary indeed. The vast majority of opinions do nothing even
approaching that degree of analysis.
Consider also the New Jersey Supreme Court case of Department of
Environmental Protection v. Ventron Corp.2 5  In considering the
dangerousness of disposal of mercury-laden wastes, the court cited
reports to the U.S. Congress as well as law review articles, both of which
recognized that the disposal of toxic wastes could cause substantial
environmental harms.276 Based on these authorities, the court concluded
that "mercury and other toxic wastes are 'abnormally dangerous,' and
the disposal of them, past and present, is an abnormally dangerous
activity. 2" Likewise, a Wisconsin appeals court looked to various
letters from the state environmental agency to support its finding that the
placement of volatile organic compounds (commonly called "VOCs") in
a municipal landfill created a likelihood of great harm.1 8 By contrast,
the Illinois Supreme Court, in affirming the lower courts' holdings that
pile driving under the Chicago River was not abnormally dangerous,
merely quoted another opinion which distinguished blasting from pile
driving,29 undertaking itself no independent scrutiny of the activity
based on the record evidence.
and on its face possesses all the factors necessary for imposition of strict
liability as set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 519 (Tent. Draft.
No. 10, 1964), above.
Transporting gasoline as freight by truck along the public highways and
streets is obviously an activity involving a high degree of risk; it is a risk of
great harm and injury; it creates dangers than cannot be eliminated by the
exercise of reasonabld care. That gasolines cannot be practicably transported
except upon the public highways does not decrease the abnormally high risk
arising from its transportation.
Siegler, 502 P.2d at 1187.
274. See Siegler, 502 P.2d at 1185-87.
275. 468 A.2d 150 (N.J. 1983).
276. See id. at 159-60 (citing Staff of Senate Comm. on the Envtl & Pub. Works,
97th Cong., Special Report on INJURIES AND DAMAGEs FROM HAzARDous WASTES-
ANALYSIS AND IMPROVEMENT OF LEGAL REMEDIES IN COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 301(E)
OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY ACT
OF 1980 (Comm. Print 1982). See also W. Stopford & L.J. Goldwater, Methylmercury in
the Environment, A Review of Current Understanding, 12 ENvTL. HEALTH PERSP., 115,
115-18 (1975); J. Zazzali & F. Grad, Hazardous Wastes: New Rights and Remedies?,
132 SETONHALLL. REv. 446,449 n.112 (1983).
277. Ventron, 468 A.2d at 160.
278. See Fortier v. Flambeau Plastics Co., 476 N.W.2d 593, 605 (Wis. Ct. App.
1991).
279. See In re Chicago Flood Litig., 680 N.E.2d 265, 280 (Ill. 1997).
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The central point to discern from these decisions is that the judicial
analysis of factors (a) and (b) is usually not illuminating. Such decisions
are typically devoid of record evidence, and are generally based largely
on judicial notice of community knowledge. Moreover, in very few
cases, apart from the typical blasting and explosive cases, is the
consideration of factors (a) and (b) dispositive. Rather, it is section
520(c) once again that controls the judicial determination of whether an
activity is abnormally dangerous.
E. Common Usage and Locational Appropriateness
Clauses (d) and (e) of section 520 have also served to circumscribe the
scope of liability, but have not had nearly the impact of section 520 (c).
As we saw earlier, Prosser was extremely anxious to reincorporate the
non-natural user principle of Rylands into the black letter rule, and he
did so in section 520(e). He also retained the common usage test that
Bohlen had formulated. A sampling of decisions shows genuine
consideration of the location of the activity, but, as a general rule,
neither the common-usage factor nor the locational-setting factor is
outcome determinative."
Consider first the cases dealing with underground storage tanks. In
Yommer v. McKenzie,' for example, Maryland's highest court ruled that
a service station's placement of underground storage tanks in close
proximity to residential water wells did create strict liability under
section 520."' The court wrote,
The fifth and perhaps most crucial factor under the Institute's guidelines as
applied to this case is the appropriateness of the activity in the particular place
where it is being carried on. No one would deny that gasoline stations as a rule
do not present any particular danger to the community. However, when the
operation of such activity involves the placing of a large tank adjacent to a well
from which a family must draw its water for drinking, bathing and laundry, at
280. See Yommer v. McKenzie, 257 A.2d 138 (Md. 1969); see also Tutu Wells
Contamination Litig., 846 F. Supp. 1243 (D.V.I. 1993). The court in Tutu Wells wrote,
It may well be, as Defendants contend, that operation and ownership of
service stations is a matter of common usage and that it is not unusual today to
find service stations in residential areas. But where, as here, the risk of
seepage is contamination of the area's precious and limited water supply,
locating the storage tanks above the aquifer created an abnormally dangerous
and inappropriate use of the land.
Id. at 1269.
281. 257 A.2d 138 (Md. 1969).
282. See id. at 140-42.
least that aspect of the actiy-y is inappropriate to the locale, even when equated
to the value of the activity.
As pointed out in Part nI.B, a number of decisions involving
underground storage tanks decided subsequent to Yommer have held that
reasonable precautions could have prevented their leakage, thereby
avoiding the application of strict liability.' Moreover, a Maryland
appellate court itself narrowly interpreted Yommer in a later toxic
contamination case, emphasizing its concern over placing onerous
burdens on landowners.2n In contrast, the Kansas Supreme Court held
that the drilling and operation of natural gas wells is not abnormally
dangerous because the operation of wells in "the Hugoton Gas Field is a
'matter of common usage' and is an appropriate activity for the place it
is carried on-i.e., it does not constitute a 'non-natural use' of the
land."'86 So, too, a Pennsylvania court held that the storage of a highly
toxic pesticide was a matter of common usage, and hence was not an
abnormally dangerous activity, relying on the testimony that four million
of thirty-six million acres of U.S. farmland treated with any pesticide
were treated with Thimet.nl
How about fireworks? An Illinois appellate court held that "under
283. Id. at 140. The court gave almost no consideration to factor (c) other than to
say that "it is proper to surmise that this risk cannot, or at least was not, eliminated by the
exercise of reasonable care." Id.
284. See, e.g., Arlington Forest Assoc. v. Exxon Corp., 774 F. Supp. 387, 391 (E.D.
Va. 1991); Hudson v. Peavey Oil Co., 566 P.2d 175, 178 (Or. 1988); Smith v. Weaver,
665 A.2d 1215, 1219-20 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995); Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co., 902
P.2d 1229, 1233 (Utah 1995); Grube v. Daun, 570 N.W.2d 851, 856-57 (Wis. 1997).
Unlike archetypical abnormally dangerous activities such as blasting, there is no
evidence to suggest "that the risk of seepage [from USTs] cannot be eliminated by the
exercise of reasonable care, or that the harm to be anticipated from the underground
seepage of gasoline is 'grave."' Hudson, 566 P.2d at 178; see also Smith, 665 A.2d at
1220 (stating that "[glasoline and other petroleum products can be stored and dispensed
safely with reasonable care"); Walker Drug, 902 P.2d at 1233 (stating that "we are not
convinced that the risk cannot be eliminated by the exercise of reasonable care"); Grube,
570 N.W.2d at 857. The Walker Drug court stated,
Absent negligence or application of an outside force, use of a UST does not
create a high degree of risk of harm to the person, land or chattels of another.
Moreover those risks that do exist can be minimized by the exercise of
reasonable care by the owner or possessor of the tank.
Perhaps because reasonable care will typically guard against any harm that USTs may
inflict, "the storage of [gasoline] in tanks is a common use and is valuable to a modem
society." Smith, 665 A.2d at 1220; see also Walker Drug, 902 P.2d at 1233 (stating "the
operation of a gas station is common, appropriate, and of significant value to the
community"); Arlington Forest, 774 F. Supp. at 391 (holding that gasoline stations fulfill
essential transportation needs in modem society).
285. See Rosenblatt v. Exxon Corp., 642 A.2d 180 (Md. 1994) (refusing to apply
strict liability to relationships between successive owners of the same property).
286. Williams v. Amoco Prod. Co., 734 P.2d 1113, 1123 (Kan. 1987).
287. See Diffenderfer v. Staner, 722 A.2d 1103, 1108 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998).
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factor (d), while displaying fireworks is not a common activity
undertaken by a large amount of individuals, certainly many individuals
view them and many municipalities display fireworks. Thus, fireworks
displays are a matter of common usage.''ns Although the Washington
Supreme Court in Klein v. Pyrodyne Corp. 9 held to the contrary as to
the common-usage issue, the point is that the common usage factor did
not represent the controlling consideration. And in each case the court
concluded that the fireworks display was conducted at an appropriate
location.O
The Alaska Supreme Court held that storage of 80,000 pounds of
explosives in a suburban area was inappropriately located, despite the
fact that storage took place on land designated for that purpose by the
United States government, because the population of the area had grown
since the designation.2 1' But a New Mexico court of appeals rejected that
view, holding that the storage of explosives, as opposed to blasting, was
not inappropriately located, despite being placed near electrical boxes.Y
We saw earlier that some courts (particularly in New Jersey) have held
that disposal of hazardous wastes constituted an abnormally dangerous
activity, placing emphasis on the dangerousness of waste disposal in
general and the location of the defendant's specific activities in
particular.93 By contrast, a Wisconsin appeals court, focusing on the
degree of knowledge of the dangers posed by disposal of hazardous
materials at a landfill, concluded that "depositing compounds containing
VOCs at the landfill was a matter of common usage.' 2 4 Indeed, when
the defendants continued to deposit such materials after regulations
288. Cadena v. Chicago Fireworks Mfg. Co., 697 N.E.2d 802, 814 (111. App. Ct.
1998).
289. 810 P.2d 917 (Wash. 1991) (en bane). The court wrote,
Pyrodyne argues that the factor stated in clause (d) is not met because
fireworks are a common way to celebrate the 4th of July. We reject this
argument. Although fireworks are frequently and regularly enjoyed by the
public, few persons set off special fireworks displays. Indeed, the general
public is prohibited by statute from making public fireworks displays insofar
as anyone wishing to do so must first obtain a license.
Id. at 921.
290. Klein, 810 P.2d at 921 (holding that fairgrounds are appropriate places for
fireworks displays); Cadena, 697 N.E.2d at 814 (same).
291. See Yukon Equip., Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 585 P.2d 1206, 1210
(Alaska 1978).
292. See Otero v. Burgess, 505 P.2d 1251, 1254 (N.M. Ct. App. 1973).
293. See, e.g., Department of Envtl. Protection v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150
(N.J. 1983); see also T&E Indus. v. Safety Light Corp., 587 A.2d 1249 (N.J. 1991).
294. Fortier v. Flambeau Plastics Co., 476 N.W.2d 593, 607 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991).
made it unlawful to do so, it was still deemed "part of a common
usage."29' However, because the landfill license did not permit such
disposal, "the companies' use of the landfill was inappropriate to the
place it was carried on."
296
And finally, how about the impoundment of billions of gallons of
phosphate slime behind earthen walls in connection with the mining of
phosphate rock? Clearly the earthen walls could break-even with the
best of care-and thereby cause extensive damage to property located
even miles away. The Florida court upheld strict liability because of the
scale of the activity and the magnitude of its attendant risk, despite
accepting defendant's contention that the activity was a suitable use of
the specific land chosen for such activity.297
The preceding discussion points to one conclusion: Liability does not
rise or fall on common usage or locational suitability; rather the cases
are "all over the map" with regard to these factors.
F. Value of the Activity to the Community
As we have already seen, some commentators have been especially
hostile toward the inclusion of section 520(f) in the definition of
abnormally dangerous activities. The cases are mixed. Judge Posner in
Indiana Harbor Bel?98 makes virtually no mention of clause (f), and one
is left with the impression that perhaps he too regards it as superfluous to
the analysis. Because in his view the inability to prove negligence is
dominant to the inquiry, Posner may never have felt the need to address
clause (f).
Few cases discuss clause (f) in any depth, and, when discussed, the
weighing of "value" reflects more a matter of judicial notice than factual
analysis. For example, the Pennsylvania Superior Court simply
summarily declared that gasoline service stations are "valuable to
modem society, '2" a statement that seems nothing more than a truism.
Another Pennsylvania decision was equally unenlightening, simply
announcing that the community value of a reservoir outweighed its
295. Id.
296. Id. at 607-08.
297. See Cities Serv. Co. v. State, 312 So. 2d 799, 801 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
298. Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. v. American Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174 (7th Cir.
1990).
299. Smith v. Weaver, 665 A.2d 1215, 1220 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (finding
underground storage tanks not an abnormally dangerous activity); see Walker Drug Co.
v. LaSal Oil Co., 902 P.2d 1229, 1233 (Utah 1995) (stating that a gas station is "of
significant value to the community"); Grube v. Daun, 570 N.W.2d 851, 857 (Wis. 1997)
(stating, "at the time the allegedly hazardous activity took place, the value to the
community of having USTs was believed to outweigh any danger from their use").
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dangerous attributes."l The Rhode Island Supreme Court, in a case
involving the release of asbestos fibers as part of a building demolition
and cleanup project, reached a similar conclusion, writing,
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the value to the community of
Certified's activities far outweighed its dangerous attributes. "[C]leanup
operations serve the valuable and essential social function of reducing the
danger" of potentially harmful substances such as asbestos. Therefore, public
policy, as well as the other factors listed in Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 520, support our conclusion that Certifieq4ould not on the facts present in this
case be held strictly liable for its activities.
A federal district court in Kansas, where landowners sought to recover
cleanup costs associated with contamination resulting from defendant's
use of solvents to degrease metal parts used in the manufacture of small
planes, invoked an incredibly broad sense of public value in dismissing
the strict liability count, writing,
PMC's manufacturing activities are indispensable to the economy of
Wichita. Metal fabrication is a necessary part of the manufacturing process of
airplanes. The aviation industry employs tens of thousands of workers in
Wichita. The location of PMC's activities was&ppropriate. They were carried
on in an industrialized area of Wichita, Kansas.
The Illinois Supreme Court in In re Chicago River Flood Litigation,3
an action brought against the city of Chicago and contractors for
flooding damage under the Chicago River, affirmed the lower courts'
decisions that pile driving and the maintenance of the tunnel system
under the riverbed were not abnormally dangerous activities.0 4  The
court described the community utility of such activities, writing,
Regarding the sixth factor, the appellate court correctly noted that the Loop
is accessible only by many of the bridges that link it with the rest of the city,
and that the piling replacement project was necessary to maintain the bridges as
part of the public transportation system. The appellate court also correctly
300. See Albig v. Municipal Auth., 502 A.2d 658 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985); see also
Cadena v. Chicago Fireworks Mfg. Co., 697 N.E.2d 802, 815 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998)
(stating that the "value of fireworks displays to the community does... outweigh their
dangerous attributes" with no explanation).
301. Splendorio v. Bilray Demolition Co., 682 A.2d 461, 466 (R.I. 1996) (citation
omitted); accord Ganton Techs., Inc. v. Quadion Corp., 834 F. Supp. 1018, 1020-21
(N.D. Ill. E.D. 1993) (holding that cleanup of PCBs from an industrial site is not an
abnormally dangerous activity that warrants the application of strict liability because of
its importance to the community).
302. Greene v. Product Mfg. Corp., 842 F. Supp. 1321, 1327 (D. Kan. 1993).
303. 680 N.E.2d 265 (fl. 1997).
304. Seeid.at281.
noted that "the management of underground tunnels [specifically, we note,
tunnels under riverbeds] to move freight, transport 5 jmnuters, house utility
lines, and disperse waste is a necessary urban activity.
Finally, a Wisconsin court, in considering contamination of water
wells from a landfill at which defendants had deposited VOCs (which
after 1969 violated regulatory standards), concluded that the activity was
not abnormally dangerous because "[t]he fact remains... that after 1969
the value to the community of the use of the landfill for VOC-waste
continued as before to outweigh its dangerous attributes. ' 6  That
conclusion appeared to be based on the fact that the landfill continued to
accept waste from all sources (commercial and household) and served a
population exceeding 12,000. At least here the court relied on record
evidence in making its finding under section 
520(f).
These few statements demonstrate the futility of requiring courts to
render a finding regarding the value of the activity to the community and
regarding whether such value outweighs the danger of the activity. The
statements are of such generality, usually without support in the record,
that there appears little justification for their inclusion in the analysis.
What is also evident from the decisions is that rarely, if ever, is the
analysis or conclusion under section 520(f) determinative of the
outcome. Perhaps that was the point Keeton, Fleming, and others made
at the ALI proceedings in 1964 in opposing the inclusion of factor (f).
Years ago courts offered much more spirited defenses of industry to
defeat strict liability, rather than the bland, innocuous statements
typically offered in connection with the consideration of factor (f). 3s
305. Id.
306. Fortier v. Flambeau Plastics Co., 476 N.W.2d 593, 608 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
307. See id.
308. See, e.g., Rose v. Socony-Vacuum Corp., 173 A. 627 (R.I. 1934). Factually,
Rose involved a claim for damages by Rose against a neighboring oil refinery arising
from the refinery's contamination and pollution of subsurface waters under its land. The
refinery's contaminated and polluted subsurface waters had seeped under an adjoining
refinery roadway and then into the water supply on Rose's nearby land that was used by
Rose not only for domestic purposes but also for his farm business that included a
piggery and hennery. Despite proving contamination of his subsurface waters and that
he had to obtain water from other sources for his domestic wants and that he had lost 136
hogs and 700 hens, and thereby the ability to continue at his farm business, this state
supreme court in 1934 disposed of his claim by stating,
It will be observed that in jurisdictions holding that, even though there is
no negligence, there is liability for the pollution of subterranean waters, the
predominating economic interest is agricultural.
Defendant's refinery is located at the head of Narragansett Bay, a natural
waterway for commerce. This plant is situated in the heart of a region highly
developed industrially. Here it prepares for use and distributes a product
which has become one of the prime necessities of modem life. It is an
unavoidable incident of the growth of population and its segregation in
restricted areas that individual rights recognized in a sparsely settled state have
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Many recent decisions suggest that factor (f) will continue to be
largely irrelevant. For example, in Green v. Ensign-Bickford Co.3  a
case involving damage resulting from an explosives manufacturer's
experimentation with a highly explosive chemical, the court did hold
that such experimentation was an ultrahazardous activity.' 0 It reasoned
that "[t]he record is devoid of facts to satisfy this [factor]," and, since
"all six factors do not need to be satisfied," it could find the activity
abnormally dangerous without ever making a value-determination under
factor (f).31' Likewise, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Department of
Environmental Protection v. Ventron Corp.12 made only a cursory and
oblique reference to section 520(f), commenting,
We recognize that one engaged in the disposing of toxic waste may be
performing an activity that is of some use to society. Nonetheless, "the
unavoidable risk of harm that is inherent in it requires that it be carried on at his
peril, ratherAan at the expense of the innocent person who suffers harms as a
result of it."
This statement too is full of truisms. Perhaps the court is really saying
that, whatever community value may be associated with dumping
mercury-laden wastes into a waterway, that value is irrelevant to strict
enterprise liability for dangerous activities. That interpretation finds
support in T&E Industries v. Safety Light Corp.314 Here the same court
discussed the lack of common usage and locational appropriateness in
the dumping of radium tailings, but never cited section 520(f) nor
considered the value to the community, but instead recited, at some
length, the principle of enterprise responsibility."5 It is quite clear that
to be surrendered for the benefit of the community as it develops and expands.
If, in the process of refining petroleum, injury is occasioned to those in the
vicinity, not through negligence or lack of skill or the invasion of a recognized
legal right, but by the contamination of percolating waters whose courses are
not known, we think that public policy justifies a determination that such harm
is damnum absque injuria.
Id. at 631-32.
309. 595 A.2d 1383 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991).
310. See id. at 1386-87.
311. Id. at 1388.
312. 468 A.2d 150 (N.J. 1983).
313. Id. at 160 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 520 cmt. h (1977)).
314. 587 A.2d 1249 (N.J. 1991). See also In re Tutu Wells Contamination Litig.,
846 F. Supp. 1243, 1270 (D.V.I. 1993) (concluding that "the community's interest in a
clean water supply far outweighs the benefits of the service stations to the community").
315. See T&E Indus., 587 A.2d at 1257. The court wrote,
The rule reflects a policy determination that such "enterprise[s] should
bear the costs of accidents attributable to highly dangerous [or unusual
whatever value to the community might have been assigned to
defendant's activities, that factor would not have influenced the court's
holding one iota.
Some courts dispose of clause (f) by simply interpreting its relevance
very narrowly. Consider, for example, the Alaska Supreme Court case
of Yukon Equipment, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co.316 While
articulating a preference for the First Restatement formulation over the
Restatement (Second) (in the context of the storage of explosives), the
Court interpreted section 520(f) to refer to only those situations where
"the dangerous activity is the primary economic activity of the
community."3"7 Recall in this regard that Prosser himself pointed to oil
drilling in Texas as an example of an activity possessing significant
value to the community,38 an illustration that perhaps supports the
Alaska court's interpretation of section 520(f).
The analysis of the Washington Supreme Court in Langan v.
Valicopters, Inc.,"' a crop dusting case holding that the activity was
abnormally dangerous, contains the most direct criticism concerning the
"value" factor. The court wrote,
As a criterion for determining strict liability, this factor has received some
criticism among legal writers.... [IThe authors suggest that § 520(0 is not a
true element of strict liability: "The justification for strict liability, in other
words, is that useful but dangerous activities must pay their own way."
There is no doubt that pesticides are socially valuable in the control of
insects, weeds and other pests. They may benefit society by increasing
production. Whether strict liability or negligence principles should be applied
amounts to a balancing of conflicting social interest [of] the risk of harm versus
the utility of the activity. In balancing these interests, we must ask who should
bear the loss caused by the pesticides.
In the present case, the Langans were eliminated from the organic food
market for 1973 through no fault of their own. If crop dusting continues on the
adjoining property, the Langans may never be able to sell their crops to organic
food buyers. Appellants, on the other hand, will all profit from the continued
application of pesticides. Under these circumstances, there can be an equitable
balancing of social interts only if appellants are made to pay for the
consequences of their acts.
These sentiments mirror the views of Page Keeton, who criticized
Prosser and the Restatement (Second) for incorporating this
activities]." Because some conditions and activities can be so hazardous and
of "such relative infrequent occurrence," the risk of loss is justifiably allocated
as a cost of business to the enterpriser who engages in such conduct.
Id. (citations omitted).
316. 585 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1978).
317. Id. at 1210. The court also concluded that utilizing this factor was "debatable."
Id.
318. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 520 cmt. h (1977).
319. 567 P.2d 218 (Wash. 1977) (en banc).
320. Id. at 223 (citations omitted).
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consideration into the strict liability scheme.
Finally, a substantial number of recent decisions involve courts that
have figuratively thrown up their hands over the matter. These cases are
totally silent regarding the application of section 520(f) to the facts of
the case."' In some such cases the courts find no strict liability
principally because of section 520(c); in others they apply strict liability
to the activity; but in none does the court give any consideration, pro or
con, to the activity's value to the community.
It is my conclusion that section 520(f) is rarely outcome determinative
on the question of abnormally dangerous activity. The analysis, if any is
undertaken, reflects generalities and banalities, offered without any
evidence on the issue, these seldom warranting much respect. Keeton's
and Fleming's apprehension that this factor would come to dominate the
analysis as did the nineteenth century notion of laissez-faire has not been
borne out. But Prosser's sense that this consideration should play a
major role in the determination is also not borne out in the decisions.
Rather, section 520(c)-the inability to eliminate the risk with
carefulness-has emerged as the dominant factor, normally being by
itself outcome determinative. This dominance is particularly common in
cases where the court finds that the activity in question is not abnormally
dangerous. Moreover, sections 520(d) and (e)-concerning whether the
activity is a common usage and is locationally suitable-are afforded a
modest level of importance in a few cases, but are rarely determinative
of the ultimate finding. Finally, section 520(f) is a wash: it simply does
not affect the ultimate decision.
321. See, e.g. (in chronological order), Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d
267, 274 (Utah 1982) (holding that percolation of oil into neighbor's water supplies was
abnormally dangerous; value to community not discussed); Bunyak v. Clyde Yancey
Dairy, Inc., 438 So. 2d 891, 894 (Fla. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that dairy farmer's liquid
cow manure abnormally dangerous; no discussion of value of activity to community);
Matomco Oil Co. v. Arctic Mechanical, Inc., 796 P.2d 1336, 1341 (Alaska 1990)
(holding that welding of petroleum tanker not ultrahazardous-risk can be eliminated by
due care; value to community irrelevant); Arlington Forest Assoc. v. Exxon Corp., 774
F. Supp. 387, 391-92 (E.D. Va. 1991) (holding that underground storage tanks not
abnormally dangerous); Hagen v. Texaco Ref. & Mktg. Inc., 526 N.W.2d 531, 539 (Iowa
1995) (stating that drilling of monitoring wells is not abnormally dangerous; opinion
focuses on fact that reasonable care would have prevented harm; value to the community
not considered); Evans v. Mutual Mining Co., 485 S.E.2d 695, 702 (W. Va. 1997)
(holding company strictly liable for damages suffered by owners when sediment pond
maintained by company broke, sending water, mud and debris down mountain onto
owner's property; no discussion of section 520(f)); Clay v. Missouri Highway & Transp.
Comm., 951 S.W.2d 617, 624 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that blasting for highway
project subject to strict liability; no discussion of section 520(f)).
IV. RNAL THOUGHTS
Had strict liability been subjected to jury control as are findings of
negligence, one suspects that its evolution might have been different.
Instead, the determination of whether an activity is abnormally
dangerous has been characterized as a question of law. Because of that
fact, courts have taken considerable liberty in relying on extra-judicial
data (typically judicially noticed generalities) in arriving at the ultimate
legal conclusion. The decision of whether an activity is a matter of
common usage or whether it is being conducted at a suitable place turns
not so much on adjudicative facts, but more on legislative or policy
judgments. After all, what kind of record evidence could possibly
answer these inquiries? Similarly, whether the value of the activity to
the community outweighs its dangerousness is an inquiry that only
marginally lends itself to traditional fact-finding. The judge has
enormous discretion in responding to these questions because she is not
bound by the record in the case. That explains why one court finds that,
for fireworks displays, the value exceeds the danger, while another court
finds just the opposite."' It also explains how one court can find the
placement of underground storage tanks to be a matter of common
usage, while another finds it is not.3n Moreover, it explains how one
court can conclude that blasting is locationally suitable in one case,
while most courts historically have found otherwise.324 My considered
opinion is that the factors in section 520 (d), (e), and (f) simply do not
guide the analysis but instead are applied to fit the outcome already
determined pursuant to section 520(c).
But, of course, the determination in the abstract of whether the risks of
an activity are capable of being managed with reasonable oversight is
itself another policy-laden determination. Because it reflects a kind of
intuitive judgment about community experience, it is not a finding that
could be made solely or even primarily on the basis of record evidence
(how could a jury answer such a question except by relying on their own
experiences outside of the courtroom?). So judges are called upon to
322. Compare Cadena v. Chicago Fireworks Mfg. Co., 697 N.E.2d 802, 814-15 (111.
App. Ct. 1998) (no strict liability for exploding fireworks), with Klein v. Pyrodyne
Corp., 810 P.2d 917, 920 (Wash. 1991) (en banc) (automatic strict liability for activity of
exploding fireworks).
323. Compare Grube v. Daun, 570 N.W.2d 851, 857 (Wis. 1997) (no strict liability
for placing storage tanks underground), with Yommer v. McKenzie, 257 A.2d 138, 140-
42 (Md. 1969) (automatic strict liability for placing storage tank adjacent to drinking
well).
324. Compare Otero v. Burgess, 505 P.2d 1251, 1255 (N.M. Ct. App. 1973) (no
automatic strict liability for activity of storing explosives), with Exner v. Sherman Power
Constr. Co., 54 F.2d 510, 514 (2d Cir. 1931).
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answer the questions required of them under the Restatement (Second)'s
tests. Those answers have increasingly embraced the view that the
negligence system by itself can accomplish the proper and desirable
results.
* -19OF
